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Indigenous Peoples and the
Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights
Kristen A. Carpenter*
Angela R. Riley**
As indigenous peoples have become actively engaged in the
human rights movement aroundthe world, the sphere of international
law, once deployed as a tool of imperial power and conquest, has
begun to change shape. Increasingly, internationalhuman rights law
serves as a basis for indigenous peoples' claims against states and
even influences indigenous groups' internal processes of
decolonization and revitalization.Empowered by a growing body of
human rights instruments, some as embryonic as the 2007 United
Nations Declarationon the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),
indigenouspeoples are embracing a global "human rights culture"
to articulate rights rangingfrom individualfreedom and equality to
collective self-determination,property, and culture. Accordingly, this
Essay identifies and provides an account of what we see as an
unprecedented, but decidedly observable, phenomenon: the current
state of indigenous peoples' rights-manifesting in tribal, national,
and internationallegal systems-reflects the convergence of a set of
dynamic, mutually reinforcingconditions. The intersection of the rise
of internationalhuman rights with paradigm shifis in postcolonial
theory has, we argue, triggered a 'jurisgenerative moment" in
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indigenous rights. Bringing indigenous norms and values to their
advocacy, indigenouspeoples have worked to assert their voices in,
and indeed to influence, the human rights movement. Indigenous
peoples are now using the laws and language of human rights,
shaped by indigenous experiences, not only to engage states but also
as a tool of internalreform in tribalgovernance. This is, in our view,
ajurisgenerativemoment in indigenous rights-a moment when both
the concept and practice of human rights have the potential to
become more capacious and reflect the ways that individuals and
peoples aroundthe globe live, and want to live, today.
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INTRODUCTION

As indigenous peoples' have become actively engaged in the human rights
movement around the world, the sphere of international law, once deployed as
a tool of imperial power and conquest, 2 has begun to change shape.
International human rights law now serves as a basis for indigenous peoples'
claims against states and even influences indigenous groups' internal processes
of revitalization. Empowered by a growing body of human rights instruments,
some as embryonic as the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), indigenous peoples are increasingly
recognized in international human rights law as possessing the "right to have
rights."4 From a historic rights vacuum, indigenous peoples have emerged to
embrace the evolution of a global "human rights culture"5 and to articulate
rights ranging from individual freedom and equality to collective selfdetermination, property, and culture.6
An examination of these global, if nascent, shifts in indigenous rights
reveals a dynamic and complex system that stretches well beyond international
legal regimes and into state and indigenous forums alike. This "multiple site" 7

1. For our working definition, we follow S. James Anaya who identifies "indigenous peoples"
as those who
are indigenous because their ancestral roots are embedded in the lands in which they live, or
would like to live, much more deeply than the roots of more powerful sectors of society
living on the same lands or in close proximity.... [T]hey are peoples to the extent they
comprise distinct communities with a continuity of existence and identity that links them to
the communities, tribes, or nations of their ancestral past.
S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2d ed. 2004).
2. See INT'L LAW ASS'N, HAGUE CONFERENCE, RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1 (2010)
("Traditional international law, Eurocentric in origin, has worked to largely ratify the attempts at the
cultural, if not physical, eclipse of indigenous peoples."). See generally ANTONY ANGHIE,
IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).

3. G.A. Res. 61/295, T 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP];
see also WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE LIGHT OF JUSTICE: THE RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
NATIVE AMERICA AND THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 3 (2013)
(describing the UNDRIP as "a landmark event that promises to shape humanity in the post-colonial
age").
4. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 296 (1951).

5. See Helen Stacy, RelationalSovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029, 2049 (2003).
6. Following Louis Henkin, we define "human rights" as the "moral-political claims which, by
contemporary consensus, every human being has or is deemed to have upon his society and
government." Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 405 (1979).
Examples include the rights enumerated in international instruments, including the UNDRIP, and
increasingly accepted as embodied in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)
at 49, U.N. Doc A/6316 (1967). For leading analysis categorizing indigenous peoples' human rights
vis-A-vis categories of international law, see, e.g., Lorie M. Graham & Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous
Sovereignty, Culture, and InternationalHuman Rights Law, 110 S. ATLANTIC Q. 403, 405 (2011)
(analyzing the recognition of provisions of the UNDRIP as customary international law).
7. Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism'sMultiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L. J. 1564, 1670 (2006).
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engagement has produced a profound human rights moment, one manifested in
the development of interrelated and inter-reliant legal norms and structures.
Events comprising the indigenous rights movement reveal not only "law's
migration," but also its generative force and potential to loosen colonization's
bind. In 2001, for example, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights held
that Nicaragua's obligation to protect property rights under Article 21 of the
American Convention on Human Rights encompassed interests defined by the
Awas Tingni peoples' own customary law of land tenure.9 In 2006, Navajo
Indians created a tribal human rights commission and later successfully lobbied
for the recognition of water and subsistence rights against powerfully aligned
federal, tribal, and corporate interests.10 In 2007, the highest court of Belize
ruled in favor of indigenous property rights, based on customary land tenure,
citing heavily to the then-draft of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples." Later that year, indigenous groups-having gathered for twenty
years at the United Nations in Geneva to press for international studies,
hearings, and lawmaking on indigenous rights-witnessed the General
Assembly adopt the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by a vote
of 144 to 4.12 Within three years, the most ardent dissenters, Canada, New
Zealand, Australia, and the United States, all reversed their opposition and
adopted the Declaration.
These examples reflect only a few of the seismic shifts occurring in
indigenous rights. For decades, indigenous peoples from across the globe have
relied on human rights regimes to challenge the laws of the nation-states in
which they reside.13 They have articulated their claims, pursuant to treaties and
other instruments, before the Inter-American Commission and Court on Human
Rights as well as before the U.N. Human Rights Council.14 Their claims often
invoke indigenous legal norms that have increasingly received recognition in
individual cases and have begun to influence the development of international
human rights law itself.'5 Concurrently, nation-states are beginning to accept
8. See generally id.
9. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 79
(2001), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humianrts/iachr/AwasTingnicase.html.
10. See Mission/Vision, NAvAJO NATION HuMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, http://www.nnhrc
.navajo-nsn.gov/missionvision.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2013) [hereinafter NNHRC Mission/Vision].
11. Aurelio Cal v. Belize, Supreme Court of Belize (Claims No. 171 and 172 of 2007) (Oct
18, 2007), available at http://www.elaw.org/node/1620.
12. See UNDRIP, supra note 3, T 12.
13. See S. James Anaya, Indian Givers: What Indigenous Peoples Have Contributed to
InternationalHuman Rights Law, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 107, 108 (2006).
14. See infra Part M.

15. See, e.g., Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 75/02,
OEA/Ser.L./VII. 117, doc. 5 rev. 115 (2002), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/75
-02a.html ("[T]he Commission concluded that the State has failed to ensure the Danns' right to
property under conditions of equality contrary to Articles II, XVIII and XXIII of the American
Declaration in connection with their claims to property rights in the Western Shoshone ancestral
lands.").
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human rights norms derived from international and indigenous sources in their
own judicial decisions, constitutions, and other activities.' 6 And indigenous
peoples themselves are employing human rights discourse as a tool for internal
reflection and reform.17 These phenomena are inextricably intertwined in
substance and form, ultimately reinforcing and reifying a truly indigenous body
of human rights law.
Building on our previous work,' 8 this Essay sets out to document and
provide a theoretical account of an unprecedented, but decidedly observable,
phenomenon: the current state of indigenous peoples' rights-manifesting at
the tribal, national, and international levels-reflects the convergence of a set
of dynamic, mutually reinforcing conditions. The intersection of the rise of
international human rights, increased indigenous participation in legal
development, and paradigm shifts in postcolonial theory has triggered a truly
indigenous human rights movement, one that pervades lawmaking at multiple
levels. This is, we assert, a realization of Robert Cover's vision in Nomos and
Narrative:'9 paideic communities that live their commitments and absorb,
process, and create law "all the way down." 20 Just as profoundly, we argue,
indigenous peoples are influencing law around and outside of their
communities, all the way up into state and international practice. By
participating in the human rights movement as peoples, indigenous peoples
have begun to transcend the state-centric model that often excludes other
groups meriting legal and political attention on the world stage. 2 In
16.
17.

See infra Part L1.

18.

See, e.g., THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY (Kristen A. Carpenter, Matthew L.M.

See infra Part 11.

Fletcher & Angela R. Riley eds., 2012); Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred
Sites Cases: Asserting a Placefor Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061 (2005) [hereinafter
Carpenter, Sacred Sites]; Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of

Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022 (2009) [hereinafter Carpenter et al., In Defense]; Angela R Riley, Good
(Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049 (2007) [hereinafter Riley, Governance]; Angela R.
Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 799 (2007) [hereinafter Riley,
Illiberalism].
19. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword:Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1983).
20. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
NeutralPrinciples,96 HARv. L. REV. 781,792 n.32 (1983).

21. Our previous works consider some of the bases for treating indigenous groups as
"peoples." See Carpenter et al., In Defense, supra note 18, at 1051-57; Kristen A. Carpenter, Real
Property and Peoplehood,27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 313, 346-57 (2008); Riley, Governance, supra note
18, at 1123. For a helpful account of indigenous peoples' involvement in international law as
challenging the state-centric model, see Lillian Aponte Miranda, Indigenous Peoples as International
Lawmakers, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 203 (2010). For seminal works on the rights and responsibilities of
"peoples" more generally, compare JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 25, 79-81 (1999) (proposing
categories of "peoples" that should be recognized as playing a role in the international legal order and
articulating limits on the behavior of non-liberal peoples such that they may still retain their
autonomy), with MARTHA C. NUsSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DIsABILrTEs, NATIONALITY,
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 244, 263 (2006) (critiquing Rawls's concept of "peoples" as vague and arguing
for a more robust view of human rights). See also Lakshman Guruswamy, Energy Justice and
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"uncovering" their own legal traditions and working to "decolonize, 2 2
indigenous experiences,2 3 they increasingly expect international human rights
law to reflect and advance indigenous norms-and for indigenous law, in turn,
to reflect the best of international human rights principles. They are advocating
this nuanced approach to human rights in various forums, including tribal, state,
and international tribunals, as well as legislatures, agencies, and other organs of
civil society. In short, we argue, the world is witnessing a jurisgenerative
moment in indigenous peoples' human rights.24 Finally, in setting forth the case
for the jurisgenerative moment, we also seek in this work to encourage greater
dialogue across the fields of indigenous rights and international human rights.
Indigenous rights scholarship is uniquely concerned with the role of indigenous
peoples in the human rights movement and whether international law will
affect indigenous peoples in their real-life struggles. 25 Although international
Sustainable Development, 212 COLO. J. INT'L & ENVTL L. & POL'Y 231, 258-65 (2010) (highlighting
Rawls's discussion regarding the duty of liberal democratic peoples to assist "burdened societies").
22. See, e.g., Robert B. Porter, A Proposalto the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize FederalIndian
Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 904 (1998); Robert B. Porter, Building a New
Longhouse: The Case For Government Reform Within the Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee, 46
BUFF. L. REV. 805, 934 (1998) (advocating decolonization of Native nations); Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
The Algebra of FederalIndian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White
Man'sIndian Jurisprudence,1986 Wis. L. REV. 219, 220-26 (1986) (discussing federal Indian law as
colonial and a vision for reformation); see also MISHUANA GOEMAN, MARK MY WORDS: NATIVE
WOMEN MAPPING OUR NATIONS 32-39 (2013) (describing the process of colonization as "ongoing");

Daniel Heath Justice, "Go Away, Water! ": Kinship Criticism and the Decolonization Imperative, in
REASONING TOGETHER: THE NATIVE CRITICS COLLECTIVE 147 (Craig S. Womack el al. eds., 2008)
(discussing Native American Studies literature on decolonization).
23. Compare JOHN BORROWS, RECOVERING CANADA: THE RESURGENCE OF INDIGENOUS
LAW, at xii (2002) (arguing that "the power of Aboriginal law can still be discerned despite the
pervasiveness of imported law"), and JOHN BORROWS, CANADA'S INDIGENOUS CONSTITUTION 2355 (2010) (describing sources and categories of indigenous law including sacred, natural, deliberative,
positivistic, and customary), with RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON
LAW: A TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE, at xvii (2009) (describing "a unique side to tribal
court jurisprudence in the United States . .. [that] involves retrieving ancient tribal values, customs,
and norms and using them to solve contemporary legal issues.").
24. Our use of the phrase "jurisgenerative moment" draws on both the work of Robert Cover
with respect to the jurisgenerative nature of certain lawmaking communities, and that of Bruce
Ackerman, who adroitly coined the "constitutional moment." Cover, supra note 19; Bruce Ackerman,
A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1519, 1519 (1997) (explaining that "[a]
constitutionalmoment occurs when a rising political movement succeeds in placing a new problematic
at the center of American political life"). We are not the first to draw on Cover's work to identify other
"jurisgenerative moments." See Judith Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic
Communities, Courts, andRobertCover, 17 YALE J.L. & HuM. 17, 27 (2005).
25. See, e.g., JAMES (SA'KE'J) YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, INDIGENOUS DIPLOMACY AND
THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES: ACHIEVING UN RECOGNITION (2008) (providing an indigenous legal history
account of the international human rights movement); MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE
UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (Claire Charters &
Rudolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009) (offering reflections and analysis by indigenous, state, and
international representatives who participated in the processes of conceiving, negotiating, adopting,
and implementing the UNDRIP) [hereinafter MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK]; REFLECTIONS ON
THE UN DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (Stephen Allen & Alexandra

Xanthaki eds., 2011) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS ON UNDRIP].
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human rights scholarship has considered questions surrounding the
development26 and implementation 27 of international human rights law, such
consideration has usually been in other contexts. Even more specifically, to the
extent that human rights discourse addresses the norm of self-determination 2 8
or the role of non-state actors in international law,29 it could benefit from
deeper engagement with indigenous peoples' experiences.30
26.

See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) (situating the human rights movement in the
values and structures emerging after World War II); LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A
HISTORY (2007) (tracing the human rights movement to Enlightenment thinking and articulations of
rights in the French and American Revolutions); SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS
INHISTORY (2010) (arguing that the contemporary human rights movement emerged as a "utopian"
movement after the demise of other political platforms in the 1970s).
27. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
InternationalHuman Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) (arguing that international human rights
law wields influence through coercion, persuasion, and acculturation); Oona A. Hathaway, Between
Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of InternationalLaw, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 469 (2005)
(arguing that international treaties wield influence by rule of law regimes within state parties and
through collateral consequences of treaty membership, including foreign aid, investment, aid, and
politics).
28. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 27, at 653 ("[C]ounterhegemonic norms exhibit the
same pattern of diffusion as prohegemonic norms, suggesting that conventional conceptions of global
power politics provide an inadequate descriptive account. One important example is the norm of selfdetermination (understood as a fundamental human right), which supported decolonization and
motivated many indigenous rights campaigns."). For more on the topic of indigenous peoples and selfdetermination, see generally ANAYA, supra note 1, at 97-184 (elaborating on the norm of selfdetermination in international law as it pertains to indigenous peoples); see also CHARLES
WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS (2006) (describing the selfdetermination movement in the United States); Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Self-Determination:
The Political Economy ofa Policy that Works (Harvard Univ. HKS Faculty Research Working Paper
Series, Paper No. RWPlO-043, 2010), available at http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/l/4553307.
29. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks: Twenty-First-Century InternationalLawmaking,
101 GEO. L.J. 725, 743 (2013) ("Finally, the new twenty-first-century international lawyering process
recognizes that states are not the only actors. Of course, neither international law nor foreign policy
have ever been completely restricted to states, but the proliferation and influence of nonstate actors has
'gone viral' in recent years. And so it is inevitable that the United States government now finds itself
developing relationships not just with states, but with civil-society and industry groups too, among
others.") (internal citations omitted); see also ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF
NONSTATE ACTORS 2 (2006); Philip Alston, The 'Not-a-Cat' Syndrome: Can the InternationalHuman
Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 3-5
(Philip Alston ed., 2005). With respect to indigenous peoples as nonstate actors, see, for example,
Clare Boronow, Note, Closing the Accountability Gap for Indian Tribes: Balancing the Right to SelfDetermination with the Right to a Remedy, 98 VA. L. REV. 1373, 1410-16 (2012) (suggesting
indigenous peoples may have rights and obligations under international human rights law through their
relationship with states, a more capacious approach to international legal personality, and/or because
they are persons or entities who enjoy certain rights and duties as a matter of customary international
law); Robert J. Miller, Inter-Tribal and International Treaties for American Indian Economic
Development, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1103, 1118-19 (2008) (considering whether Indian tribes
might be bound by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the North American Free Trade
Agreement, or the World Trade Organization).
30. See RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN
RIGHTS THOUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 60-86 (2013) (analyzing the results of empirical studies in the
areas of constitutional design, children's rights, female suffrage, and domestic violence). We recognize
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Our Essay proceeds as follows: In Part I, we consider the development of
the international human rights movement, particularly as a response to conquest
and colonization by states, and also highlight some of the key critiques to the
movement. Part II lays the theoretical background for this work, situating it
within international law, postcolonial indigenous theory, and Robert Cover's
work on the jurisgenerative process in paideic communities. Finally, Part III
gives life to the jurisgenerative moment by providing a snapshot of the multiple
ways in which we see human rights developing in indigenous, national, and
international settings around the globe today.
I.
ANTECEDENTS TO THE JURISGENERATIVE MOMENT

In this part, we consider certain antecedents to the current jurisgenerative
moment. Historically, there have been debates about whether international law
justifies indigenous conquest or guarantees indigenous rights, including
whether international law offers a viable alternative to oppressive domestic
legal regimes created to subdue indigenous peoples. In contemporary times,
wherein tribal people are increasingly asserting their collective autonomy in
governance, culture, and economic matters, many indigenous peoples have
coalesced around the use of human rights law as an instrument of
decolonization and self-determination. Accordingly, Section A identifies
several historical moments when indigenous peoples engaged with international
law and legal institutions, focusing on examples that presage the contemporary
indigenous human rights movement.
Nonetheless, we do not attempt to provide a comprehensive history of
indigenous legal interactions with states around the world, a subject that would
clearly exceed the scope of this piece.3 1 Several of our examples come from the
United States and Canada, as well as New Zealand and Australia, reflecting
particular patterns of settler-colonialismthat we describe below. In other parts

the relatively nascent state of the indigenous rights field and acknowledge that it may still be too soon
to undertake empirical studies that would most deeply and comprehensively inform these inquiries. At
this point, therefore, we offer several preliminary observations, and hope that these will lead to
additional scholarly work in the future.
31. For a broad discussion of colonial experiences around the world and the role of indigenous
peoples in lawmaking and shaping the international legal order, see generally LAUREN BENTON, LAW
AND COLONIAL CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY, 1400-1900 (2002); KEN S.
COATES, A GLOBAL HISTORY OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: STRUGGLE AND SURVIVAL (2004). For a

broad treatment of the history of indigenous peoples around the globe, see generally ANAYA, supra
note 1,at 15-72 (providing a historical context for international law's treatment of indigenous peoples
from the fifteenth century into the modern era); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990) (tracing the role of Western

legal thought in the conquest and colonization of indigenous peoples and lands by Spain, France,
England, and the United States from the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries). For an explanation of how
and where indigenous and minority rights diverged, see Will Kymlicka, The Internationalization of
Minority Rights, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 1, 6-31 (2008).
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of the world, including Latin America,32 Asia,3 Africa,34 the Arctic,3s Oceania
and the Pacific, 3 6 and the Middle East,37 indigenous peoples often experienced
conquest and colonization on different legal grounds that led to similar
experiences of widespread impoverishment, dislocation, and loss of culture and
religion. Across the world, the concept of "who is indigenous" remains
contested and varied, as do contemporary legal problems and strategies.
Acknowledging these limitations and opportunities for further work, we offer
the following brief account to provide helpful historical, legal, and thematic
touchstones for our jurisgenerative argument.
A. Formation:Rights ofIndigenous Peoples
1. The ColonialPeriod

Colonizers and indigenous peoples initially acted as separate sovereigns,
governed by international law. With the arrival of Europeans, indigenous
peoples became involved in matters of trade, passage, and security.39 In 1493,
Pope Alexander granted Spain and Portugal authority over diplomacy,

32.
See, e.g., CHARLES GIBSON, THE AZTECS UNDER SPANISH RULE: A HISTORY OF THE
INDIANS OF THE VALLEY OF MEXICO, 1519-1810 (1964); REBECCA HORN, POSTCONQUEST
COYOACAN: NAHUA-SPANISH RELATIONS IN CENTRAL MEXICO, 1519-1650 (1997); 3 THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF NATIVE PEOPLES OF THE AMERICAS: SOUTH AMERICA (Frank Salomon &
Stuart B. Schwartz eds., 1999); THE INDIAN IN LATIN AMERICAN HISTORY: RACE, RESILIENCE, AND

ACCULTURATION (John E. Kicza ed., 2000).
33.

See, e.g., THE CONCEPT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF ASIA: A RESOURCE BOOK (Christian

Emi ed., 2008); see also INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE STATE: POLITICS, LAND, AND ETHNICITY IN
THE MALAYAN PENINSULA AND BORNEO (Robert L. Winezeler ed., 1997); Benedict Kingsbury,
"IndigenousPeoples" in InternationalLaw: A ConstructivistApproach to the Asian Controversy, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 414 (1998).
34. See, e.g., ALBERT KwOKwO BARUME, LAND RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES INAFRICA
(2010); Rachel Murray, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa: The
Approach of the Regional Organisationsto Indigenous Peoples, in REFLECTIONS ON UNDRIP, supra
note 25, at 485.
35. See, e.g., CONTESTED ARCTIC: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, INDUSTRIAL STATES, AND THE
CIRCUMPOLAR ENVIRONMENT (Eric Alden Smith & Joan McCarter eds., 1997); MARK NUTTALL,
PROTECTING THE ARCTIC: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND CULTURAL SURVIVAL (1998); see also NOEL
D. BROADBENT, LAPPS AND LABYRINTHS: SAAMI PREHISTORY, COLONIZATION AND CULTURAL
RESILIENCE (2010); VELI PEKKA-LEHTOLA, THE SAMI PEOPLE: TRADITIONS IN TRANSITION (2004).
36. See generally STUART BANNER, POSSESSING THE PACIFIC: LAND, SETTLERS, AND
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES FROM AUSTRALIA TO ALASKA (2007).
37. See, e.g., J1BRAIL S. JABBUR, THE BEDOUINS AND THE DESERT: ASPECTS OF NOMADIC
LIFE IN THE ARAB EAST (1995); MORDECHAI NISAN, MINORITIES INTHE MIDDLE EAST: A HISTORY
OF STRUGGLE AND SELF-EXPRESSION (2d ed. 2002).
38. For helpful reports on the indigenous peoples in the nation-states of regions around the
world, see The Indigenous World, INTERNATIONAL WORK GROUP FOR INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS,
http://www.iwgia.org/regions (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
39. For a popular history account of such encounters, see NATHANIEL PHILBRICK,
MAYFLOWER: A STORY OF COURAGE, COMMUNITY, AND WAR 99-113 (2006) (describing the treaty
between Puritan Governor William Bradford and Indian leader Massasoit, entered into within months
of the Mayflower's arrival at Plymouth).
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governance, and trade with indigenous peoples around the world.40 Spanish
representatives implemented the encomienda system granting conquistadors,
soldiers, and officials dominion over Indian land and labor in the Americas and
the Caribbean.41 The Dominican cleric Bartolomd de las Casas decried
practices including the killing and enslavement of Indians and, along with the
theologian Francisco de Vitoria, espoused the concept of "humanity" of
indigenous peoples.42 Yet while de Vitoria recognized that indigenous peoples
had natural rights as free peoples and rejected the pope's broad grant of land
title to Spain, he also allowed that indigenous peoples' failure to abide by the
law of civilized, Christian nations could justify waging war against them.43
Here were some of the seeds of the international law justification for Indian
conquest-articulated in the Spanish Requerimiento of 1512-which led to
violence, dispossession, and devastation for indigenous peoples." International
law thus provided the European powers with practices and doctrines that both
limited and legitimated indigenous conquest and colonization.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, international law came to be
defined as the Law of Nations, which was premised on the natural rights of the
nation-state as well as the positive law of treaties and arrangements among
states. The Law of Nations projected a certain "ambiguity" with respect to the
powers of European states over indigenous peoples, with the Law of Nations'
primary intellectual proponent Emmerich de Vattel alternatively citing the right
of European states to acquire land pursuant to discovery and decrying the
conquest of certain groups.4 As a practical reality, during this era, European
and indigenous peoples often negotiated the contours of trade, war, and land
rights through treaties. Spain recognized limited indigenous governing
authority, for example, in negotiating early treaties with indigenous groups in
Chile.46 Other indigenous peoples signed treaties with England, France, Spain,
the Dutch Republic, and other nation-states.
Thus, many of the foundational legal interactions between indigenous
peoples and Europeans occurred pursuant to international law,47 and sometimes

40. See Robert J. Miller, The InternationalLaw of Colonialism:A ComparativeAnalysis, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 847, 887-88 (2011).
41. See ANAYA,supra note 1, at 16.
42. See, e.g., id at 16-19; KAREN ENGLE, THE ELUSIVE PROMISE OF INDIGENOUS
DEVELOPMENT: RIGHTS, CULTURE, STRATEGY 19-21 (2010); WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 95-103.
43. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN INWESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT:
THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 96-108 (1990).
44. See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 16-19, 36 n.20 (quoting King Ferdinand's Requerimiento of
1512 that called on "idolatrous Indians" to acknowledge the supremacy of the Catholic Church, Pope,
and Spanish monarchy over them and their lands, or otherwise submit to war, slavery, and the
destruction of property).
45. See id.at 20-25.
46. See Miller, supra note 40, at 889-92.
47. See generally Philip P. Frickey, DomesticatingFederalIndian Law, 81 MINN. L. REv. 31,

36-38, 52-53 (1996) (tracing this history in the U.S. context and arguing that it provides a basis for
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at the confluence of indigenous and European traditions. 4 8 Robert A. Williams,
Jr., draws on the example of the Gus-Wen-Tah, or the Two Row Wampum, a
treaty made in 1613 between the Haudenosaunee Confederacy and the Dutch to
illustrate the encounter and integration of indigenous and European norms in an
early legal agreement. 49 Indeed, indigenous peoples continued to bring their
own legal traditionsso-including concepts of kinship, reciprocity, and sacred
trust-to their treaty relationships with Europeans into the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.5 1
After securing their own freedom from England, however, "settler" states,
including the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, increasingly
sought to manage indigenous affairs through state law.52 Philip Frickey called
this the process of "domesticating" indigenous peoples' law. 53 In the United
States, for example, Indian tribes did not participate in the drafting or
ratification of the Constitution; nonetheless, the Constitution gave Congress
authority to regulate trade with Indian tribes 54 and declared treaties to be the
"supreme Law of the Land."55 Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court
fashioned common law rules both mediating and effectuating conquest. 5 By
virtue of the "Marshall Trilogy" of cases, Indian nations became classified as
"dependent domestic sovereigns" that, by virtue of inherent tribal sovereignty,

internationalizing "the way we think about" federal Indian law today, including concepts of
sovereignty and plenary power).
48. See generally ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN
TREATY VISIONS OF LAW & PEACE, 1600-1800 (1997).
49. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Sovereignty, Racism, Human Rights: Indian Self-Determination
andthe Postmodern World LegalSystem, 2 REv. CONST. STUD. 146, 200-01 (1995).

50. One scholar examines the argument that certain indigenous legal traditions, such as intertribal diplomacy, confederacy-formation, and treaty making should be considered "Indigenous InterNational Laws." See Amar Bhatia, The South of the North: Building on Critical Approaches to
InternationalLaw with Lessonsfrom the Fourth World, 14 OR. REV. INT'L L. 131, 145-50 (2012).

51. See, e.g., WLLIAMS, supra note 48, at 28-39. In one notable instance in 1730, Cherokee
leaders traveled to England to negotiate a treaty with King George, though in many other cases Indians
were taken as slaves or specimens, against their will, to serve as labor or curiosities for Europeans. See
also Charles F. Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing Rights of the

Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 375, 384-89 (describing tribal customary law and culture in
treaties).
52. For a discussion of "settler colonialism," see Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the
Elimination ofthe Native, 8 J. GENOCIDE RES. 387 (2006).

53. Frickey, supra note 47, at 31.
54. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, andwith the Indian Tribes") (emphasis added).
55. U.S. CONST. art VI.
56.

See Philip P. Frickey, MarshallingPastand Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,and

Interpretationin FederalIndian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381, 383-85 (1993) (arguing that federal
Indian law occupies a contested place between colonialism and constitutionalism that is mediated by
doctrines and methodologies of federal Indian common law).
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treaties, and federal supremacy, retained rights of occupancy and selfgovernance over their reserved territories. 57
Despite these formal rights, tribes were often relocated, sometimes
forcibly, from their traditional territories or pressured to accept onerous treaty
terms. In 1871, the U.S. Congress ended new treaty-making with Indian
tribes,59 and in 1903 the Supreme Court held that the United States could break
treaties with tribes without federal court review of such actions pursuant to its
"plenary authority" over tribal affairs.60 Thus Indian rights were legally
protected, but harshly limited, and ultimately subject to the power and politics
of the conquering nation. Additional limitations to tribes' criminal and civil
jurisdiction would follow.61
This was the embodiment of settler colonialism.62 In contrast to
"[t]raditional colonialism,"63 which relied on a large indigenous population for
labor for the benefit of a small group of colonists,64 in the settler state, the
native society had to be marginalized or eliminated. 65 In other words, because
the colonizers came to stay, "invasion [was] a structure not an event."6 This
version of settler colonialism was replicated with some variation in other
nations. In New Zealand, the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840 acknowledged British
protection and sovereignty, as well as Maori rights of autonomy over their own
affairs. 67 In Australia, the courts long treated aboriginal lands as terra nullius,

57.

See Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 1,37-38 (1991).

The "Marshall Trilogy" includes Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.

Georgia, 30 U.S. I (1831); and Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). See David H. Getches,
Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84
CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1577 (1996).
58. Shortly after the Supreme Court affirmed the Cherokee Nation's rights over their reserved

lands in Worcester v. Georgia,for example, Congress authorized and the executive branch executed
the removal of the Cherokee Nation to Indian Territory via the aptly named "Trail of Tears."
Thousands of lives were lost and traditional lands were taken. See Rennard Strickland & William M.
Strickland, A Tale of Two Marshalls: Reflections on Indian Law and Policy, the Cherokee Cases, and
the Cruel Irony ofSupreme Court Victories, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 111, 122-26 (1994).
59. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1871) (stating that tribes are not entities "with whom the United States
may contract by treaty," although existing treaties are in no way "invalidated or impaired").
60. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (holding that treaty abrogation did not
raise justiciable issues that could be reviewed by the Court on the merits).
61. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978); see also Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1981).
62. See PATRICK WOLFE, SETLER COLONIALISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
ANTHROPOLOGY: THE POLmCS AND POETICS OF AN ETHNOGRAPHIC EVENT 1-2 (1999); see also
AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 8-9 (2010).

63. See Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political:Race, Membership, and Tribal Sovereignty, 87
WASH. L. REv. 1041, 1119 (2012).
64. See RANA, supra note 62, at 8.
65. See Wolfe, supra note 52, at 387.
66. Id. at 388.
67. See MATTHEW S.R. PALMER, THE TREATY OF WAITANGI IN NEW ZEALAND'S LAW AND
CONSTITUTION (2008).
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freely annexing them for generations.68 Canada passed the Indian Act of 1876,
"a monolithically injurious piece of legislation" that sought to control and
centralize all aspects of Indian life from identity and governance, to land and
subsistence. 69
In all of these nations, and elsewhere around the globe, indigenous
peoples were largely denied citizenship rights during the eighteen hundreds and
were subjected to laws that distributed their lands, demolished their economies,
usurped their traditional governance systems, criminalized their religions, and
tried to "assimilate" them into mainstream society.70
During periods of intense domination by newly formed nation-states,
indigenous peoples continued to pursue international channels for the
protection of their rights and brought claims to protest nation-states' assertions
of domestic power over them. Indeed, while commentators suggest that
historically international law often neglected indigenous subjects per se, it is
also apparent that some indigenous peoples believed that the principles of
international law applied to them.71 Moreover, indigenous peoples presented
their claims through advocacy reflecting their own experiences and values,
albeit availing themselves of new forums, processes, and languages.72
2. The Emergence ofInternationalHuman Rights Law

As soon as an international tribunal became available, indigenous peoples
availed themselves of it, and while they were only somewhat successful in
initial advocacy, these efforts laid important groundwork for what would
become the modem indigenous human rights movement.
One such forum was the League of Nations, formed after World War I,
which promised self-determination for states and protection for minorities.7 3 In
1923, the Six Nations (also known as the Iroquois Confederacy) submitted a
petition to the League of Nations claiming that Canada was threatening to
"destroy all de jure government of the Six Nations" by escalating the presence
of the Royal Mounted Police on reserves and other activities designed to

68.

See generally BAIN ATTWOOD & ANDREW MARKUS, THE STRUGGLE FOR ABORIGINAL

RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1999). This practice was finally reversed by the Australia high
court in Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, and the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).
69. See Peter Scott Vicaire, Two Roads Diverged: A Comparative Analysis of Indigenous
Rights in a North American ConstitutionalContext, 58 MCGILL L.J. 607, 636 (2013).
70. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Lightning in the Hand: Indians and Voting Rights, 120
YALE L.J. 1420 (2011).
71. See, e.g., Ravi de Costa, Identity, Authority, and the Moral Worlds ofIndigenous Petitions,
48 COMP. STUD. SoC'Y & HIST. 669 (2006) (examining petitions-brought by Aborigines and

Islanders of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand, and the First Nations of North America-to the
British Empire, the Commonwealth, and the international community from 1846 to 1975).
72. See id. at 675-85.
73. See Antony Anghie, Nationalism, Development and the Postcolonial State: The Legacies
ofthe League ofNations, 41 TEX. INT'L L.J. 447,448-49 (2006).
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disrupt traditional leadership and governance practices. 7 4 The Six Nations
claimed the right to be heard, stemming in part from British treaty
recognition.75 Canada opposed the petition on grounds that "[t]he Six Nations
are not.

.

. a recognized or self-governing people but are.. . subjects of the

British Crown within the Dominion of Canada."76 The Cayuga traditional
leader, Deskaheh,n then personally travelled to Geneva where he won the
sympathies of several states, and ultimately received an informal venue to
present his claims. 78
Canada nevertheless kept the Six Nations from addressing the League of
Nations-and New Zealand did the same with the Maori; 79 yet, this early
advocacy "set in motion a series of developments that slowly advanced the
recognition of indigenous peoples rights in international law."80 As one
commentator notes, these efforts and others were entirely consistent with
indigenous traditions of self-government, advocacy, dignity, and respect:
"[w]hat was new was the presentation of these credentials to a post-imperial
international authority, one assumed to govern a moral world in which there
was a dignified place for sovereign indigenous nations."81
These efforts, like international law generally, were greatly influenced by
post-World War H developments.82 The foundational instruments of
international human rights law, including the United Nations Charter, Universal
Declaration on Human Rights of 1948, and the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, recognized individual civil and political rights, as
well as state interests in self-determination.83
But it was not immediately clear that these instruments would promote
either the individual or collective interests of indigenous peoples. In 1949, the
U.N. General Assembly recommended a study of the condition of "aboriginal
populations and other underdeveloped social groups of the American
continent" to improve their condition and foster more efficient use of their

74.

See S. JAMES ANAYA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 4-7

(2009).
75.
76.
77.

See id. at 6.
See id.
See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION 84 (Bruce Elliott

Johansen ed., 1998) (discussing Deskaheh).
78.

ANAYA, supra note 74, at 6-7.

79. See HENDERSON, supra note 25, at 24, 32 (noting that the international awareness brought
about by the Maori leader Ratana's 1925 complaints, based on the Treaty of Waitangi, to the League
eventually led to land hearings and reform in New Zealand).
80. Wenona T. Singel, New Directionsfor InternationalLaw and Indigenous Peoples, 45
IDAHO L. REv. 509, 510 (2009).
81. De Costa, supra note 71, at 685.
82. See generally Kal Raustiala, Empireand Extraterritorialityin Twentieth CenturyAmerica,
40 Sw. L. REv. 605 (2011). See also Henkin,supra note 6, at 407-08.
83. See ANAYAsupra note 1,at 251.
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resources.84 Several international conferences followed, raising awareness of
indigenous peoples.85
The first treaty to single out indigenous peoples as special subjects of
human rights concern was International Labor Organization Convention (ILO)
107, adopted in 1957. 8 Concerned about "the exploitation" of indigenous
workers during the industrial era, the ILO identified the need to protect
"indigenous and other tribal or semi-tribal populations" during the period when
they were integrating into larger national societies.87 Given this substantive
orientation and the lack of participation of indigenous peoples during its
drafting, ILO 107 was ultimately viewed as an assimilationist instrument
insufficiently cognizant of indigenous interests in political and cultural survival
as distinct entities.8
In the 1950s and 1960s, some indigenous groups placed great hope in the
global decolonization movement, believing that instruments such as the
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
(1960)-with its provisions condemning colonialism, segregation, and
discrimination-would mean freedom for indigenous peoples as well.8 But
when colonies in Asia, Africa, and Oceania gained independence, indigenous
claims for self-determination and development were merely left to new national
governments that did not typically empower indigenous peoples.90
As scholars suggest, the failure of the decolonization movement to
address indigenous concerns led a new generation of indigenous leaders to
focus on human rights instruments as a potential vehicle to address the poverty,
land loss, violence, and social problems that often plagued indigenous peoples
in the twentieth century.9 ' To the extent that international law addressed
minority rights at the time, it was largely without specific attention to
indigenous concerns. 92 The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted in 1966, affirmed that all "peoples" have a
right to "freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development," 93 and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights emphasized the rights
84. G.A. Res. 275 (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/275 (May 11, 1949).
85. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object of International
Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 369, 370 (1986).
86. See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 54.
87. Rebecca Tsosie, Reconceptualizing Tribal Rights: Can Self-Determination Be Actualized
Within the US. ConstitutionalStructure?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 923, 926 (2011).
88. See Alexandra Xanthaki, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS: SELFDETERMINATION, CULTURE AND LAND 49-101 (2007).

89. See, e.g., HENDERSON, supra note 25, at 27-28.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., id
92. See generally S. James Anaya, The Capacity of InternationalLaw to Advance Ethnic or
NationalityRights Claims, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CuLTuRES 321 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995).
93. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (stating that "[a]ll peoples have the right of selfdetermination").
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of minority groups "to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their
own religion, [and] to use their own language."94 The International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) of 1969
required states to adopt measures combating racial prejudices and
discrimination,95 and certain UNESCO instruments emphasized the right to
cultural identity.96 Yet, while these international human rights instruments,
especially the common recognition of the right to "self-determination" in both
the ICCPR and ICESR, offered a potential correction to the Universal
Declaration's exclusion of any reference to collective or group rights, states
remained eager to quash potential claims 'for any separate political existence by
indigenous groups.97 As Rebecca Tsosie points out, states continued to resist
indigenous self-determination, "fearing that this might cause political
destabilization and trigger movements toward secession." 98 In the indigenous
rights movement, there were several strands of thinking about selfdetermination, with certain proponents advocating for a robust version of
territorial integrity and the right to separate from states; 99 and others calling for
a pragmatic blend of indigenous self-governance and meaningful engagement
with states that would not necessarily require secessionloo to achieve the
freedom, integrity, and respect sought by indigenous peoples.' 0

94. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
95. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 7,
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter CERD].
96. See, e.g., U.N. Educ., Sci. & Cult. Org. (UNESCO), Decl. on Race and Racial Prejudice,
UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res. 20 C/Res. 3/1.1/2 art. 5, 20th Sess. (1978), U.N. doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982
/2/Add. 1, annex V (1982); Decl. of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation, UNESCO
Gen. Conf. Res. 14 C/Res. 8 art. 1, 14th Sess. (1966).
97. It bears noting, however, that these covenants have resurfaced in more recent years as a
source of law available to protect indigenous rights. For example, in Mabo v. Queenland, the court
cited Australia's obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Mabo v.
Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 42 (citing the ICCPR). Similarly, the United Nations Human
Rights Committee cited to the Covenant's Article 27 in Ominayak v. Canada, Commc'n No.
167/1984, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 45th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex 9, U.N. Doc. A/45/40
(1990).
98. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribalism, Constitutionalism, and Cultural Pluralism: Where Do
Indigenous Peoples Fit Within Civil Society?, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 376 (2003).
99. See generally Patrick Thornberry, Self-Determination and Indigenous Peoples:
Objections and Responses, in OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-

DETERMINATION 39, 52, 54 (Pekka Aikio & Martin Scheinin eds., 2000).

100. See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 109 (articulating the contours of remedial and ongoing selfdetermination and noting that "[s]ecession .. . may be an appropriate remedial option in limited
contexts ... where substantive self-determination for a particular group cannot otherwise be assured or
where there is a net gain in the overall welfare of all concerned"); see also S. James Anaya, SelfDetermination as a

Collective Human Right Under Contemporary International Law, in

OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 99,

at 3.
101.
Erica-Irene A. Daes, The Spirit and Letter of the Right to Self-Determination of
Indigenous Peoples: Reflections on the Making of the United Nations Drafi Declaration, in
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3. Evolutions in InternationalLaw and the IncreasingRecognition of the
Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples

By most accounts, it was during this same period, beginning in the 1960s
and continuing through the present, that the contemporary indigenous human
rights movement gained momentum.102 As indigenous peoples around the
world gained better access to formal education, economic resources, and
political organization, they coalesced around ongoing mistreatment and
subordination by states. Indigenous leaders-elders, traditional advisers,
organizations, and academics-met at conferences and talking circles. They
envisioned the ways in which the ideals of peace, freedom, justice, and
membership in the human family captured in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights "were remarkably similar
to those [sentiments] embodied in the
03
peoples."'
Indigenous
of
legal traditions
These developments were accompanied by broader action and
involvement around the world. Indigenous advocates began appearing at the
ILO, U.N., and UNESCO, and these institutions, in turn, began to reassess the
role of indigenous peoples in international law. For example, the International
Indian Treaty Council, founded in 1974 at a gathering of the American Indian
Movement in Standing Rock, South Dakota, gained "non-governmental
organization" status at the U.N. Economic and Social Council in 1977.'0 The
U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities completed a highly influential study on indigenous peoples, and in
1977 the U.N. hosted a conference of NGOs on discrimination against
indigenous peoples, which two hundred indigenous representatives traveled to
Geneva to attend.'s In 1982, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights established the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations (UNWGIP). The UNWGIP offered a formal structure and venue
for indigenous peoples to articulate their values and struggles, and for states to
respond. 106
OPERATIONALIZING THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION, supra note 99,

at 67, 79.
102.

See, e.g., SHELAGH LEVANGIE, GLOBALIZED NATIVE POLrIcs: NEGOTIATING THE

UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 7 (2008); see also

Miranda, supra note 21, at 219 (postulating four factors that have enabled indigenous peoples to
participate in international law "during the past forty years," including "(1) shifts in ideological
conceptions of indigeneity; (2) local affronts to indigenous peoples' way of life and greater
opportunities for transnational coalition-building, simultaneously facilitated by circumstances of
globalization; (3) attention under international law to promoting ideals of participatory democracy; and
(4) advocacy by indigenous peoples aimed at greater recognition of participatory rights").
103. See HENDERSON, supra note 25, at 31.
104. See INTERNATIONAL INDIAN TREATY COUNCIL, http://www.treatycouncil.org/about.htm
(last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
105. See Augusto Willemsen-Diaz, How Indigenous Peoples' Rights Reached the UN, in
MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK, supra note 25, at 16, 21.
106. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the FrontiersofInternationalHuman Rights
Law: Redefining the Terms ofIndigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 672-
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As indigenous peoples developed a growing global consciousness, shared
identity, and common set of goals, international human rights instruments
began to reflect these sentiments.10 7 In 1989, in response to calls by indigenous
peoples and others, the ILO began a process to draft and ultimately adopt a new
convention. The resulting instrument, ILO Convention No. 169 "Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples," provided that "indigenous and tribal peoples
shall enjoy the full measure of human rights and fundamental freedoms without
hindrance of discrimination."' 0 8 While disclaiming any particular legal effect of
the term, ILO 169 recognized the rights of indigenous and tribal "peoples" in a
clear departure from ILO 107, and also expressed respect for the ongoing
existence of indigenous and tribal lifeways.109 More specifically, it
acknowledged the "social, cultural, religious, and spiritual values and
practices" of indigenous and tribal peoples; called for "special measures" to
safeguard the "persons, property, labour, cultures, and environment" of the
peoples concerned; and articulated a standard of "due regard" for the "customs
and customary law" of indigenous and tribal peoples."10 Finally, it provided
that state governments "shall . . . consult the peoples concerned .. . whenever
consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which
may affect them directly.""'
While ILO 169 failed to meet certain aspirations in terms of both process
and content, 112 it was still a relatively progressive instrument for its time. ILO
169 recognized indigenous group identity and community, and called for

82 (1990); see also Erica-Irene A. Daes, The Contribution of the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations to the Genesis and Evolution ofthe UN Declarationon the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples,
in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK, supranote 25, at 48.
107. See RONALD NIEZEN, THE ORIGINS OF INDIGENISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS

OF IDENTITY 1-28 (2003) (considering the emergence of indigenous identity as a modem
phenomenon).

108. International Labour Organisation Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries art. 3, June 27, 1989 (entered into force, Sept. 5, 1991)
[hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169], available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/fVp
NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::Pl2100_1.OCODE:C169; see also ANAYA, supra note 1,at 58-61.
109. ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 108, art. 1(3), arts. 13-44; see also Lee Swepston,
The ILO Indigenousand Tribal Peoples Convention (No. 169): Eight Years After Adoption, in HUMAN
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 17, 18-28 (Cynthia Price Cohen ed., 1998).

110.

LO Convention No. 169, supranote 108, arts. 4-5, 8.

111.

Id art 6.

112.

The ILO is a tripartite organization in which states are represented by representatives

from government, employers, and workers. There is a great deal of literature commenting on the extent
to which this structure and adaptations to it allowed indigenous peoples to participate in ILO 169. See,
e.g., LUIS RODRiGUEZ-PIFIERO, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, POSTCOLONIALISM, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW: THE ILO REGIME (1919-1989), at 291-331 (2005) (describing some of the factors that limited
indigenous leadership and participation in the ILO 169 drafting and adoption process, thereby
challenging the overall legitimacy and legacy of the Convention); Swepston, supra note 109, at 18-28
(describing "special arrangements . . . made for indigenous representation in order to
overcome ... exclusivity in the ILO's concept of NGOs," which included workers' and employers'
representatives).
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"special measures" to implement its provisions." 3 Moreover, as a binding
covenant of international law, ILO 169 remains vitally important to indigenous
advocacy, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean where fifteen of the
twenty states to ratify the Convention are located.' 14
In 1985, the UNWGIP formally embarked on the project of drafting a
declaration focused specifically on the rights of indigenous peoples. 115 The
UNWGIP provided opportunities for indigenous peoples to participate in the
process, including by commenting on draft principles and working papers.
Reflecting these points of engagement, the former chairperson of the Working
Group on Indigenous Populations described the "substantive contributions
made by indigenous peoples" to the draft declaration.!' In 1993, the UNWGIP
submitted a draft declaration that was adopted by the Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 1994. The next year, the
Commission on Human Rights considered this draft and established a Working
Group on the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples for further
work.1 7 States increasingly mobilized to participate in the process.!18 For
years, indigenous and state representatives struggled over the meaning and
scope of "indigenous," "peoples," "self-determination," and other key
provisions.11 9
The version of the Declaration presented to the General Assembly
affirmed that indigenous peoples have the right to full enjoyment, "as a
collective or as individuals," of all human rights recognized by the U.N.
Charter, Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and international human
rights law.120 It retained the language from early drafts on "indigenous peoples"
and "self-determination," as well as rights to traditional lands, economic
development, education, family and child welfare, self-government, culture,
religion, expression, and others.121 Key provisions call for states to obtain "free,
prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or
administrative measures" affecting indigenous peoples. 12 2 Near the end of the
113. See Tsosie, supra note 87, at 927 ("11L 169 attempted to create a middle ground,
claiming that indigenous peoples were entitled to the full measure of human rights accorded to others,
and that their unique social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices should be recognized
and protected.").
114. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice confirms international
treaties, custom, general principles, and judicial decisions as sources of international law. See
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060.
115. See ANAYA, supra note 1,at 63.
116. See Miranda,supra note 21, at 242 (quoting Erica-Irene Daes).
117. See ANAYA, supra note 1,at 63.
118. Id. at 63-64.
119. See, e.g., Andrea Carmen, International Indian Treaty Council Report from the Battle
Field-The Struggle for the Declaration, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK, supra note 25, at 86,

91 (articulating the struggle of indigenous representatives to reflect a broad indigenous viewpoint).
120.

UNDRIP, supra note 3, art. 1.

121.
122.

Id arts. 1-46.
Id art. 19.
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negotiation process, several African states sought and obtained specific
language protecting the territorial integrity of states, a concession that rankled
some indigenous representatives.123
In 2007, the General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted the Declaration
(UNDRIP). 124 Within several years, the four nations in opposition-the United
States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia-all reversed their positions. The
UNDRIP acknowledges rights common to humanity-such as nondiscrimination, equality, and property-and contexts for the enjoyment of those rights
that may appear more particular to indigenous peoples, such as spiritual
attachment to traditional lands and a focus on community rights.12 5
As described in greater detail in Part III, ILO 169, UNDRIP, and regional
instruments have, in a remarkably short period of time, motivated pivotal
changes in laws and values regarding indigenous rights, thereby influencing
tribal, domestic, and international legal systems. 12 6
B. Indigenous Peoples andHuman Rights Law: Some Critiques

At the same time that the indigenous human rights movement is taking
shape, its critics are mobilizing. To provide a richer picture of some of the key
tensions in indigenous human rights discourse and advocacy, we outline here
the most salient criticisms articulated thus far by scholars and advocates. In
doing so, we emphasize the interconnected nature of the critiques and
acknowledge that they, like the movement itself, are still emerging. To simplify
this discussion, we group the multifaceted critiques in two main lines of
thought: skepticism about international human rights law (along several axes)
and criticism of the reliance on "culture" (and concomitant claims of
homogeneity) to advance indigenous rights.

123.
See CHARMAINE WHITE FACE & ZUMILA WOBAGA, INDIGENOUS NATIONS' RIGHTS IN
THE BALANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 104-06

(2013) (describing changes made to Article 46 as "offensive").
124. UNDRIP, supra note 3.
125. See generally id. See also HENDERSON, supra note 25, at 11-12 ("Indigenous peoples
created the Declaration with their own style of diplomacy with the nation-states and the UN system.
This diplomacy is as important as the principles in the Declaration. The tenacity of Indigenous
diplomacy and the legal traditions that inform it are the deep structure of the Declaration."); Julian
Burger, The UN Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples: From Advocacy to Implementation,

in REFLECTIONS ON UNDRIP, supra note 25, at 41, 42-43 ("[The Declaration] responds to the reallife problems that threaten the existence of indigenous peoples as identified by indigenous peoples
themselves. One of the remarkable features of the Working Group ... was that the rights proposed
were garnered from specific experiences, expressed in the language of the elder, community leader,
woman or youth activist. How else could the recognition of indigenous peoples' spiritual relationship
with their lands be included in an international human rights instrument, if not through countless
stories of this non-materialist and harmonious bond between humankind and nature?").
126. It is beyond the scope of this article to elaborate on all international covenants and
declarations referencing indigenous peoples. For a helpful source, see generally ANAYA, supra note 1.
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1. Skepticism About InternationalHuman Rights

Running through discussions of the drafting and ultimate adoption of the
UNDRIP was and is a concern that human rights law generally, 12 7 and the
UNDRIP in particular, represents the imposition of foreign legal culture on
indigenous peoples, with assimilationist overtones and effects.128 For one,
critics worry that UNDRIP's ultimate implementation holds the unwelcome
power to displace tribal cultural values and disrupt tribal relationships,
potentially upsetting, for example, gender-specific roles in tribal religions and
property distribution systems that may be inapposite to Western notions of
individual equality. 12 9
Moreover, because the UNDRIP and all international regimes continue to
place the nation-state-rather than autonomous, indigenous groups-at their
center, indigenous peoples still lack true recognition as political entities.1 3 0 This
potentially undermines rights of self-determination, including the freedom of
indigenous groups to "choose their own governments, cultures, and territories
from within their own cultural traditions or views."' 3 Essentially, as with past
hegemonic regimes, the concern is that indigenous peoples may only guarantee
their rights in the international sphere if they do so on the terms of the nationstates and powerful entities that have long worked to dismantle and oppress
them. 132

There is a second strand of skepticism about human rights law
surrounding the indigenous rights movement, which represents the other end of
the spectrum; that is, whether human rights law is likely to make any difference
to indigenous peoples at all. 133
127.

See, e.g., Makau Mutua, Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor ofHuman Rights,

42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201, 204-06 (2001) (describing human rights as "fundamentally Eurocentric");
Makau Wa Mutua, The Ideology ofHuman Rights, 36 VA. J.INT'L L. 589 (1996).
128. As Elvira Pulitano writes, "there is indeed a certain irony in the fact that the Declaration
is framed in the language of international human rights law, the same law that legitimized the
superiority of imperial colonial powers and the destruction of indigenous cultures." See Elvira
Pulitano, Introduction to INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF THE UN DECLARATION 1, 6 (Elvira
Pulitano ed., 2012). H. Patrick Glen also notes the Declaration's roots in "the profoundly western
notion of international law." H. Patrick Glenn, The Three Ironies ofthe UN Declarationon the Rights
ofIndigenousPeople, in REFLECTIONS ON UNDRIP, supra note 25, at 171.

129. See Pat Sekaquaptewa, Comments at the Thelton E. Henderson Center for Social Justice
Symposium: Heeding Frickey's Call: Doing Justice in Indian Country (Sept. 28, 2012) (describing
difficulties in imposing Western notions of equality on tribes wherein religious roles and property
rights are assigned by gender).
130. See Duane Champagne, UNDRIP (United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples):Human, Civil, andIndigenous Rights, 28 WICAZO SA REv. 9, 20 (2013).
131. Duane Champagne, IndigenousAffirmative Action, INDIAN COUNTRY (Aug. 5,2011).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Duane Champagne, Can UNDRIP Be Enforced?, INDIAN COUNTRY (Mar. 5,
2012). For a nuanced critique along these lines see Miranda, supra note 21, at 204 ("While indigenous
peoples' participation may serve to lend greater legitimacy to international human rights law and
lawmaking processes, such participation may not effectively deliver material gains."). International
law in general has been sharply criticized by scholars who contend that it rarely works to constrain
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Human rights activists across fields have long operated with a very clear
understanding of the sharp limits on change afforded by any international
human rights regime.134 Pointing to the UNDRIP's status as a nonbinding
instrument with no enforcement mechanism, and the lack of domestic
implementation in most countries, some suggest that the document is, at best,
an aspirational statement of policy with little practical import or effect.135 As
we describe in greater detail in Part III, even states that have opted in to
oversight regimes, such as the ILO's Supervisory System (providing for
various types of reports and complaints) or the ICCPR's First Optional Protocol
(allowing for complaints to the U.N. Human Rights Committee), may fail to
implement the holdings and recommendations of reviewing tribunals.136 The
possibility of so much weight being placed on UNDRIP when it-and other
similar instruments-are incapable of securing real change for indigenous
groups bolsters the claim from critics that the indigenous rights movement
should direct its energies elsewhere.
Finally, skeptics about international indigenous rights worry that
recognition of indigenous rights, especially to property and territory, threatens
to reify or rework colonial relationships. In short, there is little guidance in the
UNDRIP or otherwise for resolution of competing claims among indigenous
groups. Thus, framing claims about traditional land tenure as property rights
narrows the focus of indigenous activism to litigation, entrenches disputes
among neighboring indigenous groups, and legitimizes the state-centered
regimes in which the claims are filed.13 7 When implemented on the ground,
moreover, laws that give legal effect to traditional land tenure-but fail to
account for the fact that neighboring peoples often have overlapping,
multilayered relationships with land and with each other-have arguably led to

state interests, and compliance and enforcement are rare. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMiTH & ERIC A.
POSNER, THE LIMITs OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (2005).
134. See generally GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 133. But see Kal Raustiala, Refining
the Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 423, 427 (2006) (contending that
Goldsmith and Posner's critiques of international law "bend too far towards realist skepticism" and fail
to take account of "a wide range of scholarship illustrating the power of international law and
institutions"); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International
Tribunals:A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAUF. L. REV. 899 (2005). See also STONES

OF HOPE: How AFRICAN ActivisTS RECLAIM HuMAN RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE GLOBAL POVERTY
(Lucie E. White & Jeremy Perelman eds., 2011).
135. See Champagne, supra note 133.
136. See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 105-31 (providing an overview of implementation and
enforcement mechanisms, including the implementation of the UNDRIP); see also id. at 145-82
(describing ILO Supervisory System); id. at 194-214 (describing CERD); id. at 215-50 (describing
adjudication by the Human Rights Committee under ICCPR Optional Protocol); id. at 264-319
(providing cases and reports of the Inter-American Court and Commission of Human Rights).
137.

See, e.g., Joel Wainwright & Joe Bryan, Cartography, Territory, Property: Post-Colonial

Reflections on Indigenous Counter-Mapping in Nicaraguaand Belize, 16 CuLTURAL GEOGRAPHIES
153 (2009).
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conflict.138 To the extent that human rights regimes promote the recognition of
indigenous resources as fixed legal entitlements protected by the laws of states,
they may seem to inflame, rather than resolve, issues endemic to the colonial
experience.1
2. The Myths and Consequences of CulturalCohesion
The unique nature of indigenous rights and the manner in which they are
often articulated has given rise to several criticisms about how an international
human rights regime based on a concept of "indigeneity"-however broadly
defined-will interact with, reify, and perhaps even stagnate indigenous
cultures.
One strand of this critique asserts that the concept of "culture" is itself
problematic and misused in the indigenous rights movement.14 0 In essence, the
concern is that deploying unique cultural attributes as a basis for claims of
indigenous rights might have a narrowing and confining effect. As one author
puts it, "right to culture claims, when successful, threaten to limit the groups
that might qualify for protection, force groups to overstate their cultural
cohesion, and limit indigenous economic, political, and territorial
autonomy." 4 1 In other words, indigenous groups' insistence on and adherence
to these ideals may unduly confine efforts at true cultural evolution, selfdetermination, economic development, and other rights.1 42

138.

See Joe Bryan, Dilemmas of Indigenous Land in Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua,

ANTHROPOLOGY NEWS, Sept. 2006, at 22.

139. See id.
140. In a provocative new book, Karen Engle draws on the work of Gyatri Spivak to argue that
indigenous human rights advocates are inappropriately employing "strategic essentialism" to
characterize indigenous demands in terms of certain cultural attributes, particularly attachment to land.
ENGLE, supranote 42, at 10-13. She argues that the decision to frame contemporary struggles in terms
of "human rights to culture" is an attempt, unsuccessful in her view, to mediate the tension between the
individualist, Western conception of human rights and the indigenous interests in communal land and
traditional economic, social, and cultural practices. Id at 13.
141. See id. Engle's concern is the subordination of indigenous "development" goals to a
"cultural" agenda, which she sees as an "unintended consequence" of the indigenous rights movement.
Id at 7-13. For a somewhat different view of the role of human rights in indigenous development
issues, see Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Role of InternationalLaw in Intrastate Natural Resource
Allocation: Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Peoples-BasedDevelopment, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 785, 792 (2012) (arguing that "an emerging human rights approach based on the substantive land
and resource rights of peoples supports a peoples-based model of development potentially capable of
more readily alleviating conditions of inequity and continued subordination for historically
marginalized communities").
142. Engle is not alone in her view that indigenous identity is a problematic basis on which to
claim rights. Anthropologists often criticize "culture" in this context, expressing the view that modern
hybridities undermine the connection between indigeneity and legal rights. See Adam Kuper, The
Return of the Native, 44 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 389, 395 (2003) (arguing that when indigenous
peoples "demand recognition for alternative ways of understanding the world," they do so "ironically
enough ... in the idiom of Western culture theory").
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A second strand of the culture critique focuses on conflicts that may arise
within communities that purport cultural cohesion-what this Essay will later
term "paideic nomos"-particularly when those cultural practices are enforced
by "authoritative interpretations.",14 3 The concern is that, to the extent tribal
autonomy empowers a collective right to govern through customary law, it
challenges the fundamental precepts of international human rights law.144 As
Martha Minow observes, "One of the touchiest points of contention involves
whether individuals or groups are the primary unit of analysis and protection
for human rights.",145 In the individual-centered view, international human
rights law is meant to protect the individual against the state; thus, where the
language of human rights has been employed to facilitate indigenous selfgovernance, it may have the effect of immunizing indigenous groups from
human rights accountability.14 6 This could potentially lead to the exclusion or
suppression of dissident voices. 147
This critique has taken on particular resonance in countries that have
relied on international human rights regimes-bolstered by the UNDRIP in
some instances-to advance collective indigenous rights and tribal autonomy.
Cases where individuals face discrimination, exclusion, or even oppression
within their tribal communities, perpetuated by the tribal authorities to which
they are subject, are percolating up from the tribal level to gain prominent
attention.148 From Mexican villages where indigenous women are denied the
right to run for office under tribal law,14 9 to Indian tribes that pass membership
along gender-based bloodlines,1 50 to Micronesian cultures that maintain rigid
caste systems to organize village life,' 5' the stories of indigenous individuals

143. See Resnik, supra note 24, at 27.
144. See id. at 48-50.
145. Martha Minow, Is Pluralisman Ideal or a Compromise?:An Essayfor Carol Weisbrod,
40 CONN. L. REv. 1287, 1306 (2008).
146.

See Wenona T. Singel, Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability, 49 SAN DIEGO

L. REV. 567, 585 (2012). As one commentator writes, "autonomous rule by indigenous groups has, in
some countries, created de facto states within states, which effectively shields indigenous communities
from any obligation to protect the fundamental rights of their individual members who remain
particularly vulnerable to the will of the collective group." Rebecca Gross, The "I" in Indigenous:
Enforcing Individual Rights Guarantees in an Indigenous Group Rights Context, 23 N.Y. INT'L L.

REV. 65, 67 (2010). For a discussion of how tribes have dealt with the incorporation of individual
rights protections into indigenous communities, see Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal
Revitalization, 35 ARIz. ST. L.J. 889, 895-98 (2003) (discussing the general process by which tribes
adopted individual rights provisions).
147. See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REv. 495 (2001).
148. See Singel, supra note 146, at 585.
149.

See Lorraine Orlandi, Three Times the Suffering, LATIN AMERICA PRESS (Mar. 6, 2008),

http://lapress.org/articles.asp?iten-l&art-5525.
150. See Riley, Illiberalism, supra note 18, at 810-13 (discussing Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), and the patrilineal membership regime of the Pueblo).
151.

See Larry Wentworth, The International Status and Personality of Micronesian Political

Entities, 16 ILSA J.INT'L L. 1 (1993); Richard C. Paddock, Pocket Change for Giants, L.A. TIMEs
(June 30, 2006), http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/30/world/fg-yap30.

2014]

THE JURISGENERATIVE MOMENT

197

within tribal communities continue to emerge, highlighting a central tension in
international human rights law as applied to self-governing indigenous groups:
how to protect the individual civil and political rights of tribal members while
simultaneously advancing indigenous self-government and, concomitantly,
indigenous peoples' cultural survival.152
All of these critiques are deeply resonant and important in the indigenous
context, and many unanswered questions remain. To date, there has been less
empirical data gathered on the impact of indigenous rights law than on the
impact of international law more broadly or its other subfields. 53 Accordingly,
while we agree there are legitimate complaints about indigenous rights law, we
contend the critiques are either incomplete or premature. It is possible that they
will prove unduly skeptical of indigenous rights law insofar as they fail to fully
account for the instances in which indigenous peoples are deeply and
consciously involved in architecting a human rights system that bridges-or at
least aspires to bridge-Western and indigenous ideals, mechanisms, and
outcomes at every level.
As we have suggested above, indigenous peoples historically have been
deeply involved in international human rights advocacy and have obtained the
knowledge of its language and processes to address their needs as peoples. This
history suggests that indigenous peoples are not naive about the contradictions
inherent in the human rights movement; 154 to the contrary, preliminary
assessments indicate they are acknowledging and addressing these challenges
on their own terms.1ss
Contemporarily, just as indigenous peoples deploy human rights law to
support claims for natural resources, religious freedoms, and equality against
states, they are also using the language and instruments of human rights to
inspire internal reflection on tribal governance. Indigenous scholars and tribal
152. Will Kymlicka has long engaged the tensions at the intersection of liberal theory and
multiculturalism, with a focus on reconciling individual versus group rights. WILL KYMLICKA,
MULTICULTURAL CmZENsHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 166-70 (1995); WILL
KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 196-98 (1989); see also, Minow, supra note

145, at 1307-08 (discussing the work of Kymlicka and the questions raised by Santa Clara Pueblo);
Riley, Illiberalism, supra note 18, at 80-81. See generally Riley, Governance, supra note 18. As our

previous work describes, these questions are of particularly pressing concern in the United States in
light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Santa Clara Pueblo.
153.

Cf Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and

International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 258 (2011) (engaging in a detailed examination of the ways in
which international law impacts state behavior).
154. See, e.g., Gerald Torres, Indigenous Peoples, Afro-Indigenous Peoples and Reparations,
in REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

117 (Federico Lenzerini ed., 2008) (analyzing the contested status of "afro-indigenous" peoples in land
claims in "Anglo and Latin America").
155. See Anaya, supra note 13, at 108 ("Historically, international law can be seen as
complicit in patterns of colonization, ultimately upholding the sovereignty asserted by colonizing
states over indigenous peoples and their lands.").
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leaders, for example, are developing proposals for dispute resolution
mechanisms to address precisely the kinds of individual rights claims' 5 6 and
intertribal disputes 5 7 that seem most problematic today. Similarly, indigenous
peoples and advocates are deeply and consciously engaged with questions of
identity and culture as they relate to economic development, land claims, and
other matters.158 Admittedly few of these deep conflicts-between the
individual and the collective, among tribes, or between cultural and economic
needs-have been satisfactorily resolved.159 As we have noted in previous
works, indigenous communities are struggling with these challenges.160 Where
we see great promise is at the confluence of indigenous traditions and human
rights, a space in which indigenous peoples may be able to develop approaches
to resolving these contemporary problems. This is a critical aspect of the
jurisgenerative process, as we describe below.
II.
NOMOS, NARRATIVE, AND THE DECOLONIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

In his seminal work Nomos and Narrative, Robert Cover characterized
paideic communities as those that "live within the complex encodings of
commitments."l61 In Cover's language, such communities are uniquely
jurisgenerative-or law-creating-simply because the very act of living daily

156. See Singel, Accountability, supra note 146, at 611-25 (proposing an inter-tribal treaty
system to resolve tribal claims).
157.

See, e.g., Davis Washines, Columbia River Fishing Site Disputes, DIPNETTER (May

2011), http://www.critfc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/2011_05.pdf (describing the development of
a dispute resolution process to address conflicts among tribal members and between tribes, with
respect to fishing rights arising out ofboth treaties and customary tribal law).
158. See, e.g., Lorie M. Graham, An InterdisciplinaryApproach to American Indian Economic
Development, 80 N.D. L. REV. 597, 599-628 (2004) (describing the right to development as a human
right that requires nuanced analysis of social, cultural, and other conditions in indigenous context); see
also John A. Cordes, Mining andIndigenous Peoples, 1997 INT'L RESOURCES L. no. 2, paper 9B, 9B-

30 (discussing "development with identity" in mining activities).
159. See, e.g., Jessica Jones, Cherokee by Blood and the Freedmen Debate: The Conflict of
Minority Group Rights in a Liberal State, 22 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1 (2009) (discussing the dispute

between certain Cherokees of African descent and the Cherokee Nation regarding enrollment status);
see also Greg Rubio, Reclaiming Indian Civil Rights: The Application ofInternationalHuman Rights
Law to Tribal Disenrollment Actions, 11 OR. REV. INT'L L. 1 (2009) (applying international human

rights standards to internal indigenous matters).
160. See generally Kristen A. Carpenter, Individual Religious Freedoms in American Indian
Tribal Constitutional Law, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY, supra note 18, at 159

(identifying and evaluating various tribal constitutional approaches regarding individual claims for
religious freedom against tribal governments); Kristen A. Carpenter & Ray Halbritter, Beyond the
Ethnic Umbrella andthe Buffalo: Some Thoughts on American Indian Tribes and Gaming, 5 GAMING

L. REV. 311 (2001) (recognizing the challenge of respecting tribal identity and culture while pursuing
economic development); Riley, Governance, supra note 18 (describing conflicts between individual
tribal members and tribes).
161. Cover, supra note 19, at 29 (describing how Mennonite communities align their "sacred
narratives" with their conceptions of law).

2014]

THE JURISGENERA TIVE MOMENT

199

life entails law creation. 162 In this Section, we draw on Cover's iconic work
first to describe the uniquely jurisgenerative features of self-governing
indigenous communities. We then discuss the intersection of Cover's theory
with the work of theorists and activists concerned with the "decolonization" of
laws that have cabined the possibilities and rights of the world's indigenous
peoples.' 6 3 We highlight this intersection to lay the groundwork for
understanding the observable trend in Native governance-which we describe
using detailed examples in Part 111-toward an increased focus on international
human rights law as a catalyst for jurisgenesis within indigenous communities.
A. Robert Cover and the Nomos and Narrative ofAmerican Indian Nations

Cover's Nomos and Narrative articulated a thick'" theory around the
nomos, or "normative universe," where "law becomes not merely a system of
rules to be observed, but a world in which we live."' 65 Cover focused on what
he described as "paideic" communities: those that "live within the complex
encodings of commitment-their sacred narratives-that ground the
understanding of the law that they offer." 66 For Cover, these groups were
defined as those for whom life, culture, religion, and the daily routines of being
a human in a social community are deeply intertwined with religious belief and
practice; he offered Mennonites, Orthodox Jews, and the Amish as examples.167
Cover extended his ideas to American Indian tribes only by footnote,' 68
but subsequent scholars have built on his work to describe the paideic nature of
indigenous groups, particularly those for whom the sacred and the secular are
inextricably intertwined.'69 One oft-cited example is that of the traditional
162. Id. at 15-16 ("Thus it is that the very act of constituting tight communities about common
ritual and law is jurisgenerative by a process of juridical mitosis. New law is constantly created
through the sectarian separation of communities. The 'Torah' becomes two, three, many Toroth as
surely as there are teachers to teach or students to study. The radical instability of the paideic nomos
forces intentional communities--communities whose members believe themselves to have common
meanings for the normative dimensions of their common lives-to maintain their coherence as paideic
entities by expulsion and exile of the potent flowers of normative meaning.").
163. This "decolonization" literature represents an intellectual thread running most
prominently through scholarship on "settler colonial" states. See, e.g., Wolfe, supra note 52; Wolfe,
supranote 62; Patrick Wolfe, The Settler Complex: An Introduction, 37 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES.

J. 1 (2013).
164. See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 395-99 (1971) (discussing "thin" and "full"
conceptions of the good); see also Adina Schwartz, Moral Neutrality and Primary Goods, in JOHN
RAwLS: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS OF LEADING PHILOSOPHERS VOL. II 137, 141 (Chandran Kukathas

ed., 2003) (characterizing Rawls's dual conceptions of the good as "thin" and "thick" theories).
165. Cover, supranote 19, at 4-5.
166. Id at 29; see also Resnik, supra note 24, at 20-22 (applying Cover's theory to the debate
about whether Muslim girls should be permitted to wear headscarves in French public schools).
167. Resnik, supra note 24, at 27.
168. Cover, supra note 19, at 32 n.94 ("Respect for a degree of norm-generating autonomy has
also traditionally been incident to the federal government's relations with Indian tribes.").
169. See generally Resnik, supra note 24; Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group
Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. REV. 175
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Pueblos of the Southwest, who still maintain theocratic governments. For these
tribes, there is no separation between the spiritual and secular orders, and
leaders are chosen according to secret ritual, with rights and duties set and
maintained in private. 170
Robert A. Williams Jr. was one of the first indigenous legal theorists to
embrace Cover and use his work as a vehicle for richer understanding of tribal
peoples as deeply jurisgenerative. Williams tied Cover's work to tribal
sovereignty as conceived in the United States-specifically focusing on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be governed by
them.' 7' In this sense, self-determination and jurisgenesis intertwine, as both
recognize the right of Indian people to govern themselves according to their
"shared normative commitments."l72 Thus, the paideic nomos of Indian nations
is facilitated and maintained through the restoration and continuation of
indigenous peoples' rights to live in accordance with their own laws and
traditions.1 73
To that end, Cover's work and the subsequent extensions of his theory
contemplating indigenous peoples as paideic communities provide the
theoretical grounding for this Essay. We find that considering indigenous and
tribal peoples around the world through the lens of jurisgenesis helps in
understanding indigenous law-creation and in grasping indigenous peoples'
historical and contemporary status as largely distinct from the nation-states that
threaten to engulf them. The phenomenon we have identified further reveals
that law-creation is occurring at every "level" at which indigenous peoples
make and experience law: tribal, national, and international. Critical to
understanding the jurisgenerative moment, however, is realizing that this
process is neither discrete nor confined to each respective "level," but migrates
to other planes of law-production, creating an entirely new nomos within which
indigenous rights are central.174 The examples provided in Part III illustrate this
process.
Though we find Cover's work critical to the theoretical underpinnings of
the jurisgenerative moment, it does not stand alone. As we describe in Part B
below, Cover's foundational theories combine with transformative shifts in
decolonization literature and practice to provide an even richer and fuller
picture of the jurisgenerative moment in indigenous rights law.

(2000) (discussing the interconnected of the sacred and secular in many indigenous religious
worldviews).
170. See Riley, Governance, supra note 18, at 1100-01.
171. Williams, supra note 49, at 149; see also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding
that a tribal court, rather than an Arizona state court, had jurisdiction to hear a civil suit because the
action arose on a Navajo reservation).
172. See Williams, supra note 49, at 149 & n.7.
173. Id. at 149.
174.

See generally Resnik, supra note 7.

THE JURISGENERA TIVE MOMENT

2014]

201

B. The PostcolonialConvergence

In the past twenty years, most prominently in the so-called settler nations
of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, indigenous studies
scholars have increasingly engaged decolonization theory.'7 5 Legal scholars in
the United States, in particular, have focused on the concept of decolonization
to better understand all the ways in which the exceptional position of Indian
tribes within the United States has threatened the full exercise of sovereignty
and their equality within the federal system. Because a grasp of this
exceptionalism is key to understanding the impact of both colonial law and
efforts to decolonize the law, we provide here (1) a brief account of the relevant
history and (2) a sketch of the decolonization literature, in both cases focusing
particular attention on the situation of American Indian tribes.
1. American Indian Tribes and the United States

Indian nations are anomalous within the federal system.176 Tribes are preconstitutional and have never been formally incorporated into the American
constitutional framework, allowing them to maintain a separate sovereignty that
defines their relationship with the United States.177 But American laws
advancing Indian autonomy have increasingly come under scrutiny as
potentially violative of equal protection norms, which focus on formal
equality. Thus, as one author has pointed out, American "[c]onstitutional
supremacy is a great achievement of Americans but a threat to Native
American tribes." 79 In other words, "[e]qual protection jurisprudence provides
for equality of assimilation into the constitutional reality," but "assimilation
80
into the jurisdictional monopoly destroys rather than benefits tribes."
This unique history and political status means that Indian tribes all too
often find justice elusive, as they cannot be reconciled as either sufficiently

175.
176.

See generally Wolfe, supra note 163.

See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher,

Tribal Membership and Indian Nationhood, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2013) (describing the

"anomalous character of Indian tribes" and the conflicts this poses in an increasingly "color-blind[]"
society).
177.

See generally Singer,supra note 57.

178. The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552,
2565 (2013), reveals the Court's increasing skepticism of laws, like the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA), that are meant to preserve and advance Indian autonomy, sovereignty, and cultural survival.
See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (2012). The Court decided against the
interpretation of ICWA advanced by the birth father and the tribe, warning that such an interpretation
"would raise equal protection concerns." Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565; see also Krakoff, supra
note 63, at 1051-90 (detailing the historical context in which tribes as political sovereigns arose and
the potential challenges raised by contemporary equal protection doctrine).
179.

Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2280,

2306 (1989).
180. Id.
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within or without the federal system.' ' Indeed, the entire field of American
Indian law is constitutionally, historically, and jurisprudentially characterized

by exceptionalism.18 2
This status creates a paradox for Indian nations whose presence in what is
now the United States long predates European contact. This continent-Turtle
Island to many' 3 -is the setting for the creation stories of the indigenous
peoples who call it home. The sacred places that define their spiritual
existence-much like Mecca, Jerusalem, and Mount Calvary to other religious
adherents184-are here on this continent. For Native people, every component
of their peoplehood is tied up in and defined by the lands from which they
originated.185 In indigenous cultures, these lands are not only historical
territories; they are also sacred places giving rise to human life, societal values,
subsistence practices, and religious beliefs.186 Around the globe, remarkable
natural landscapes-Uluru (Ayers Rock) in Australia, Mato Tipila (Devil's
Tower) in Wyoming, Machu Picchu in Peru, among countless othersconstitute sacred sites for indigenous peoples. 8 7
American Indians were peoples invaded, whose sacred places were taken
from them by force (of law, starvation, or war), and these are the places to
which many of them still seek to return.1 Thus, in the conquest of America,
indigenous peoples resisted colonization in part because of the deep cultural
and spiritual connections they maintained to the physical territory itself. These
connections to land form the political relationship of American Indians with the
United States. In this context, American Indians' intense patriotism, manifested
in overrepresentation in the armed forces and active participation in foreign
wars, though perhaps baffling to non-Indians initially, should be understood as
consistent with the sincere connection that American Indians feel with their
homeland.1 89
The incongruity created by the process of settler colonialism is perhaps
most prevalent in legal development within Indian tribes. Consider, for
181. Compare Lyng v. Nw. Cemeteries Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (holding that the First
Amendment does not protect the Free Exercise claims of Indians to sacred lands that are owned by the
federal government), with Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (holding that
Indian land claims are exceptional and, therefore, a taking of aboriginal title is not a "taking" according
to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution).
182. See Philip P. Frickey, (Native)American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119
HARV. L. REV. 433, 434-35 (2005).
183.

(2010).
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See DUANE CHAMPAGNE, NOTES FROM THE CENTER OF TURTLE ISLAND, at viii-ix

See Carpenter,SacredSites, supranote 18, at 1062-63.
See Carpenter et al., In Defense, supra note 18.
See id
See id
See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
See LINDSAY F. HOLIDAY ET AL., U.S. DEPT. VETERANS AFFAIRS, AMERICAN INDIAN

AND ALASKA NATIVE VETERANS: LASTING CoNTRIBUTIONS 6 (2006); see also Angela R. Riley,

Indians andGuns, 100 GEO. L.J. 1675, 1702-03 (2012).
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example, the challenges that indigenous peoples face in maintaining or
adapting contemporary governmental institutions. To achieve recognition and
legitimacy in the eyes of outsiders, tribal institutions oftentimes must emulate
the state and federal systems or risk being considered too far afield from
prevailing notions of American constitutionalism to be tolerable.190 On the
other hand, if tribal institutions, particularly tribal courts, merely mirror the
state and federal systems, and they do not reflect indigenous laws and values,
the process of colonization has truly been complete.191
Despite the consequences of colonization, however, for the last several
hundred years Native nations within the United States have engaged in their
own process of law-making, revitalization, and institution-building within the
bounds of the settler colonial state.192 Though many indigenous governing
systems, religions, languages, and cultures survived throughout history, Indian
peoples have undoubtedly been shaped by the colonial mindset manifest in
American society and unequivocally embedded in American law.
Unquestionably, then, one design feature of indigenous governance in
contemporary America can accurately be described as a reaction to the
processes of colonization.
Thus we find that indigenous governance in a colonized world is seldom
free to evolve organically, as it is so often grown in the shadow of
colonialism.193 Because of the influence of colonization, tribes may overtly
resist changes otherwise desirable that may be perceived as too Western.1 94 In
other cases, tribes-perhaps even unknowingly at times-develop rules and
legal institutions that are directly born out of reaction to colonial rule.195 We
recognize, of course, that no government can distinguish itself from the
political and historical milieu in which it formed. Nor do we mean to suggest
that all changes in indigenous cultures from the point of contact until
contemporary times must be the result of colonial forces.' 96 At the same time,
Indian nations continue to wrestle with the overriding plenary power of
Congress-a situation that is very different from, for example, that of the

190. See Riley, Illiberalism, supra note 18.
191. See id
192. See Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for
Economic Development on American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES Do?: STRATEGIES
AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1, 17-21 (Stephen Cornell &
Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1993) (describing cultural "match" as a factor in successful nation-building by
tribes).
193. See Anaya, supra note 13, at 108 (describing the colonial vestiges of law); Robert B.
Porter, Pursuing the Path of Indigenization in the Era of Emergent International Law Governing the
Rights oflndigenous Peoples, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 123, 123 (2002).
194. Cf CHAMPAGNE, supra note 183, at 50.
195. See Riley, Governance, supranote 18, at 1077-78.
196. See CHAMPAGNE, supra note 183, at 49-50.
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United States, which has long enjoyed relative independence in making its own
law.197

2. The DecolonizationLiterature

Indigenous legal scholars have undertaken vociferous criticism of the
body of law devised by the federal government to "manage" the affairs of
Indian tribes-so-called federal Indian law. As a way to contemplate freeing
tribal governments from colonial binds, legal scholars have engaged in a
decades-long scholarly debate about how best to "decolonize" Indian law.198
These critiques are framed in opposition to the United States' colonial
domination of Indian peoples and its continued assertion of power over Indian
tribes. This assertion of power, at times, appears virtually limitless and without
corresponding duties to honor the obligations of the sacred trust established
between the U.S. government and Indian nations. Efforts to decolonize Indian
law include wide-ranging proposals for action taken by American Indian tribes,
from resisting American citizenship,199 to dismantling the doctrine of
discovery,200 to using tribal courts to limit colonization's reach within tribal
communities.201
One approach has gained traction in recent years and holds particular
resonance for this inquiry. Numerous scholars and activists have repeatedly
advocated for increased engagement with the international arena to advance
indigenous rights and to reconceptualize the status of indigenous groups within
nation-states.202 They have long noted the absence of an appeal to international
human rights principles as a symptom of continued colonial domination.20 But
today, scholars and advocates are more actively embracing the confluence of
indigenous and international law, particularly as set forth in the UNDRIP, and
they point to it specifically as a vital tool in the decolonization movement. 204
Some commentators note, albeit with caution, that the UNDRIP reflects a
distinctly indigenous influence on process and substance, that has in turn
impacted both domestic and international law. 20 5
In the past few decades, increased attention to indigenous selfgovernance, articulation of decolonization theories, postcolonial political shifts,
197.

See Resnik, supra note 7, at 1583.

198. See Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REv. 77, 121 (1993).
199. See Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Native
Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act ofForcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples,

15 HARV.BLACKLETTER L.J. 107, 175 (1999).
200. See Williams, supra note 22, at 293.
201.

See Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REV.

841, 865-66 (1990).
202. See Anaya,supra note 13, at 108; Williams, supra note 106, at 660.
203.

See Anaya, supra note 13.

204.
205.

See HENDERSON, supra note 25, at 11-12.
Id.
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active engagement by indigenous peoples, and global reflection on the rights of
marginalized peoples have converged. And this convergence-some presenting
as internal evolutions, others as exogenous shocks-has inspired a powerful
postcolonial opportunity for indigenous peoples. In this sense, we see the
jurisgenerative moment as a descriptively demonstrable phenomenon that is
shaping and supporting the generation of tribal law itself.
In the final Part III of this paper, we turn our attention to the way in which
indigenous groups are engaging in jurisgenerative processes at the tribal,
national, and international levels. In addition, we provide a theoretical account
to describe how this amalgam of legal norms meet, combine, and influence one
another to produce a genuinely jurisgenerative moment in human rights.
III.
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE JURISGENERATIVE MOMENT IN
HUMAN RIGHTS
Across the globe, indigenous peoples are and historically have been
marginalized, existing largely outside the political structures of the nationstates that have formed around them. Statistics demonstrate that today they are
among the world's poorest, unhealthiest, and least educated people.206 In
addition, they are often subjected to violence and the loss of livelihood and
property. 207 Ongoing discrimination is a key contributor to indigenous peoples'
shared oppression, particularly as nation-states authorize mineral exploration
and extraction on indigenous lands, oftentimes without consultation, consent, or
compensation. 208
As indigenous peoples and their advocates consider strategies for
addressing these past and ongoing harms, it is critically important to assess
whether and how international law impacts indigenous rights and experiences
209
on the ground. We note that, given the recent vintage of the international
human rights movement, it is too early to make any conclusive or sweeping
judgments; nevertheless, we contend that a distinctly jurisgenerative process of
mutual influence is apparent. For example, global and regional human rights
tribunals are relying on indigenous customary law as a basis for indigenous
rights. States are beginning to accept human rights norms derived from

206.

See SECRETARIAT OF THE PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, U.N. DEPT.

OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, STATE OF THE WORLD'S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 21-29 (2009),
availableat http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfiildocuments/SOWIPweb.pdf.
207. See id at 29-39.
208.

See Jonathan Kaiman, Ecuador Auctions off Amazon to Chinese Oil Firms, GUARDIAN

(March 26, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/mar/26/ecuador-chinese-oil-bids-amazon
("Indigenous groups claim they have not consented to oil projects, as politicians visit Beijing to
publicise bidding process."); Simon Romero, Violence Hits Brazil Tribes in Scramblefor Land, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 2012, at A6 (describing the killing of indigenous peoples for their lands).
209. See, e.g., Goodman & Jinks, supra note 27, at 623-30; Graham & Wiessner, supra note
6; Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference, Ill YALE L.J. 1935 (2002).
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international and indigenous sources in their own judicial decisions,
constitutions, and other activities. And tribal courts, councils, and commissions
are more frequently citing international instruments as a source of tribal rights
and responsibilities.
In Sections A, B, and C, we discuss examples of the jurisgenerative
moment as exemplified in international, domestic, and indigenous legal
systems, demonstrating the mutual and dynamic influence of various sources of
law, legal actors, and institutions. Our discussion focuses not only on cases that
are "victories" for indigenous parties, but rather identifies and describes
examples that illustrate the variety of indigenous peoples' engagement with
human rights law.
A. In InternationalLaw

Scholars have argued persuasively that indigenous peoples have had a
profound impact on international human rights law. 2 10 As one commentator
notes, "indigenous peoples have played a significant role in changing the legal
landscape of human rights," yet they have done so "in ways that are not
necessarily captured by mainstream accounts of non-state actor participation in
international norm-building and decision-making."211 Indeed, it is through their
sheer persistence in advocacy and insistence on "discursive strategies" that
indigenous peoples have pushed international law to reflect indigenous norms
and values, at least to some degree.212
Through their participation in myriad initiatives, indigenous peoples are
pressing international organizations to be responsive to indigenous norms,
values, and claims in their standard-setting work.213 As described above,
activities leading up to the adoption of the UNDRIP offer perhaps the most
transformative example of indigenous voices in international lawmaking. 2 14 But
many other advocacy initiatives illustrate similarly engaged participation,
including the Convention on Biodiversity's working group on traditional

210. See generally Anaya, supra note 13.
211. See Miranda,supra note 21, at 203-04.
212. See RHIANNON MORGAN, TRANSFORMING LAW AND INSTITUTION: INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 117-38 (2011) (arguing that indigenous
peoples' advocacy has "reconfigured" hunan rights through "discursive" and other strategies).
213. In one leading example, indigenous peoples have formed their own international
organization, the Indigenous Circumpolar Conference, designed to promote unity and international
advocacy among over 160,000 Inuit people living in several nation-states. See INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR
COuNCIL, http://www.inuit.org (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
214. See Luis Enrique ChAvez, The Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples Breaking
the Impasse: The Middle Ground, in MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK, supra note 25, at 96;
Siegfried Wiessner, IndigenousSelf-Determination, Culture, and Land: A Reassessment in Light ofthe
2007 UN Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples, in INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF

THE UN DECLARATION, supra note 128, at 31 (considering assertions of indigenous "voice" in
international human rights law).
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knowledge;215 the World Intellectual Property Organization's Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional
Knowledge and Folklore (IGC);216 the World Bank's Directive on Indigenous
Peoples;217 the World Health Organization's indigenous peoples programs;218
and various climate change initiatives.2 19
In this Section, however, we focus specifically on jurisprudence arising
from international and regional decision-making tribunals, including organs of
the U.N., the Organization of American States (OAS), and other institutions.
This examination reveals the influence of indigenous customary law in a
diverse range of disputes: membership, property rights, equality, and others.
This phenomenon is remarkable on several grounds. First, the recognition
of indigenous customary law has afforded greater protection of indigenous
property rights, which are essential to self-determination, self-governance, and
continued cultural existence. 2 20 Second, considering that indigenous peoples'
internal affairs-including matters bearing on family relations, religious life,
and political leadership-are governed by indigenous customary law, the
inclusion of these laws into international decision-making processes is critical
to achieving meaningful equality and self-determination for indigenous
peoples.
International dispute-resolution bodies were contemplating indigenous
customary law as early as 1981, when the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (HRC) considered Lovelace v. Canada,221 in which a Canadian
Indian woman relied on indigenous, customary law to challenge in an
22
international tribunal the sexually discriminatory rules of the Indian Act.
Though the HRC ultimately decided the case on different grounds,22 3 this initial
215.

See Traditional Knowledge, Innovations and Practices, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSrrY, http://www.cbd.int/traditionallintro.shtml (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
216. Intergovernmental Committee, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
217. WORLD BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL §OP 4.10: Indigenous Peoples (2005).

218.

The Health and Human Rights ofIndigenous Peoples, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION,

http://www.who.int/hhr/activities/indigenous/en (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).

219.

See Annalisa Savaresi, The Role of REDD in the Harmonisation of Overlapping

InternationalObligations,in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 391 (Erkki J. Hollo, Kati Kulovesi &
Michael Mehling eds., 2013) (describing indigenous peoples' participation in climate change and
forest management practices).

220.

See Kent McNeil, Indigenous Land Rights and Self-Government: Inseparable

Entitlements, in BETWEEN INDIGENOUS AND SETTLER GOVERNANCE, 135, 135-37 (Lisa Ford & Tim
Rowse eds., 2013).
221. Lovelace v. Canada, Commc'n No. R.6/24, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40) at 166
(July 30, 1981) [hereinafter Lovelace], available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs
/session36/6-24.htm. The case has many parallels to the United States case of Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
222. Lovelace, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40), In 5-6. Note that both parties used
competing visions of customary law to support their respective arguments.
223. The HRC largely based its decision on Article 27 of the ICCPR. ICCPR, supra note 94,
art. 27,999 U.N.T.S. at 171.
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foray into the use of indigenous customary law foreshadowed the coming trend
of "law's migration" 224 from indigenous communities to international
regimes. 225
In the years after Lovelace, some of the most groundbreaking indigenous
rights decisions came out of regional human rights institutions, rather than
through the United Nations. In the Americas, the Inter-American Commission
of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have been at
the forefront of incorporating indigenous customary law into the growing body
of indigenous human rights.226
The 2001 case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v.

Nicaragua (Awas Tingni)227 has taken its place as the Inter-American Court of
Human Right's landmark case regarding indigenous rights. 228 It involved a
dispute over Nicaragua's grant of a thirty-year lease to a logging company on
the ancestral lands of the Miskito, Rama, and Sumo peoples.229 After review,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights filed the case in the Court
on behalf of the indigenous groups.23 At first glance, the questions presented in
Awas Tingni appear largely procedural in nature: whether, for example,
Nicaragua had violated the American Convention on Human Rights by failing
to "adopt[] effective measures to ensure the property rights of the

224.

See generally Resnik, supra note 7.

225.

For accounts of post-Lovelace legislation and advocacy, see, e.g., Sarah E. Hamill,

McIvor v. Canada and the 2010 Amendments to the Indian Act: A Half-HeartedRemedy to Historical

Injustice, 19 CONST. F. CONSTITUTIONNEL 75 (2010); Elizabeth Jordan, Residual Sex Discrimination
in the Indian Act: ConstitutionalRemedies, 11 J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 213, 220 (1995); Wendy Moss,
Indigenous Self-Government in Canada and Sexual Equality Under the Indian Act: Resolving
Conflicts Between Collective and Individual Rights, 15 QUEEN'S L.J. 279 (1990); INDIAN & N.
AFFAIRS CAN., DISCUSSION PAPER: CHANGES TO THE INDIANACTAFFECTING INDIAN REGISTRATION
AND BAND MEMBERSHIP, MCIVOR V. CANADA 2-3 (2009), http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM

/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-text/mci1100100032488_eng.pdf; see also Mahuika v. New
Zealand, Commc'n No. 547/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (Oct. 27, 2000), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/547-1993.html (looking at Maori processes in determining
that New Zealand's settlement of Maori fishing rights claims under the Treaty of Waitangi did not
violate Maori equality); infra notes 297-303 and accompanying text.
226. For a full discussion of the differences between the Court (which may only exercise
jurisdiction and issue legally binding opinions where the state concerned is a party to the Convention
and also has accepted the optional jurisdiction of the Court, pursuant to Article 62 of the Convention)
and the Commission (which may only issue recommendations), see generally ANAYA, supra note 1, at
258-59; Dinah Shelton, Environmental Rights and Brazil's Obligations in the Inter-AmericanHuman
Rights System, 40 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 733 (2009).
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(2001).
228. See, e.g., S. James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case ofAwas Tingni v. Nicaragua:
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Human Rights: Indigenous Lands, Loggers, and Government Neglect in Nicaragua,9 ST. THOMAS L.
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Community."21 But embedded in this inquiry was a second, crucial question:
How are the property rights of the Community to be measured and defined?
Nicaragua contended that its indigenous residents could not have a
recognized property interest in their ancestral lands because they lacked formal
title. But, relying on the right to property as defined in the American
Convention on Human Rights (the Convention), the Court disagreed. Looking
to the indigenous groups' own system of allocating land as a source of law, 23 2
the Court emphasized that "[a]mong indigenous peoples there is a
communitarian tradition. . . in the sense that ownership of the land is not
centered on an individual but rather on the group." 233 Moreover, "the close ties
of indigenous people with the land must be recognized and understood as the
fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their
economic survival."2 34 The Court further noted that Nicaraguan law also
recognized that indigenous individuals had possessory rights in their communal
lands. 235 Even in the absence of "real title," the Court concluded that the
community's continuous possession of the land should suffice for official
recognition and registration of its property rights.236
The Court's groundbreaking opinion-spawning what has been referred to
as the "Awas Tingni effect" 237-held that indigenous peoples' customary law
238
of land tenure could give rise to property rights pursuant to the Convention.
The case has resonated through other similar Inter-American system claimssuch as the U.S. aboriginal title case of Dann v. United States 239-wherein the
Commission relied on Awas Tingni's interpretation of the right to property to
find that the United States had deprived the Danns of equal protection and

231.

Id.

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.T151.
Id. 149.
Id.
Id. 150.
Id. 151-53.
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237. See Luis Rodriguez-Pifiero, The Inter-American System and the UN Declaration on the
Rights ofIndigenous Peoples: MutualReinforcement, in REFLECTIONS ON UNDRIP, supra note 25, at
457, 459-65.

238.

The Court also found a corresponding state obligation to recognize indigenous land rights

via demarcation. See Alexandra Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights in InternationalLaw over the Last 10
Years and Future Developments, 10 MELB. J. INT'L. L. 27, 32 (2009) (explaining that Awas Tingni

"has been viewed as the definitive point" of reference in indigenous property rights). As Alexandra
Xanthaki notes, "This was the first binding international decision to recognise such a collective right to
indigenous peoples and to interpret the American Convention in such manner that recognises
indigenous collective rights." Id
239. See, e.g., Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
75/02, OEA/Ser.L.VIII. 117, doc. 5 rev. $ 5 (2002). The Danns also took their case regarding mining
and waste storage on sacred sites to the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination under its early warning and urgent action procedure. See CERD, Early Warning and
Urgent Action Procedure: Decision 1(68), 68th Sess., Feb. 20-Mar. 10, 2006, T 10, U.N. Doc.
CERD/C/USA/DEC/1 (Apr. 11, 2006) [hereinafter CERD, Decision 1(68)] (urging the United States
to "freeze ... desist from ... [and] stop" actions being taken against the Western Shoshone peoples).
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procedural fairness in proceedings terminating their land titles. 24 0 Then, in
2004, in Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District v. Belize,24 1 the
Commission went further and formally adopted the Awas Tingni principle,
affirming that states must effectively demarcate indigenous peoples' lands and
that the "customary land tenure system [should] be taken into account in this
process."242
A subsequent string of cases in the Court reinforced the work of the
Commission and even expanded on the principles laid out in Awas Tingni. In
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the Court amplified Awas
Tingni and acknowledged the "close ties of indigenous peoples with their
traditional territories and the natural resources therein associated with their
culture."243 In holding that they "must be safeguarded by Article 21 of the
American Convention," the Court further expressed a desire to protect the
indigenous groups' cultural, religious, and economic lifeways, including the
means by which such values are passed through oral tradition.244 The Court
followed up on Yakye Axa shortly thereafter, further clarifying the property
rights of the Enxet-Lengua peoples in Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v.
Paraguay.245
A subsequent cascade of cases expanded on the right to property principle.
In Moiwana Community v. Suriname, the Court extended the contours of Awas
246
The Court
Tingni, upholding indigenous peoples' right to property.
suggested that possession was not necessary for securing recognition of
indigenous peoples' aboriginal title to ancestral lands, if "they have been
deprived of' the right to use and enjoy those lands because of violence
perpetrated by agents of the state.247 And Saramaka People v. Suriname
ordered that a state "delimit, demarcate, and grant collective title over the
territory" of an indigenous group, "in accordance with their customary
laws." 248
In all of these cases, it is apparent that the Inter-American Commission
and Court are developing a jurisprudence of legally cognizable indigenous

240. See CERD, Decision 1(68), supra note 239, 134.
241. Maya Indigenous Cmty. of the Toledo District v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-An.
Comm'n. H.R, Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.IJV/II. 122, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2004).
242. Id. 1 132.
243. Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmnty. v. Paraguay, Inter-An. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 125, 137
(June 17, 2005), availableat http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_125_ing.pdf.
244. Id
245. Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmnty. v. Paraguay, Inter-An. Ct. H.R (ser. C) No. 146,
(March 29, 2006), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec 146 ing.pdf.
246. Moiwana Cmnty. v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, M 131-34 (June 15,
2005), availableat http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_124_ing.pdf.
247. Id. 134.
248. Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, T 194 (Nov. 28,
2007), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec172 ing.pdf (emphasis
added).
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rights under human rights instruments. As the Court described in Awas Tingni,
the Court's "evolutionary interpretation of international instruments for the
protection of human rights. .. protects the right to property in a sense which
includes .. . the rights of members of the indigenous communities within the
framework of communal property." 249 The subsequent opinions demonstrate
that the jurisgenerative moment in Awas Tingni has persisted, along with a
growing understanding that deep connections with particular lands are a
constitutive aspect of indigenous cultures. The unique nature of the relationship
between the people and the place dictates that a core feature of selfdetermination for indigenous groups includes respect for the right to continued
existence on their traditional lands. 25 0 Thus, the cases reach even further than
they first appear, in that they acknowledge ongoing importance of the link
between indigenous peoples and their lands, despite historical dispossession

and colonization. 25 1
In sum, the inclusion of indigenous customary law in cases with nationally
binding impact is one defining aspect of the jurisgenerative moment. While
there is enormous progress to be made, much has been gained, and much can be
learned, from this bottom-up-and down again-jurisgenerative phenomenon.
B. In Domestic Legal Systems

In this Section, we focus on the myriad ways in which nation-states have
begun to implement indigenous rights, as influenced by international human
rights law, in the domestic sphere. 2 52 This phenomenon is seen most clearly in
the express adoption of international law through legislative, executive, and
249. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79,
$ 14 (2001).
250. See Carpenter et al., In Defense, supra note 18, at 1032-38.
251. See id at 1046-87 (articulating a theory of indigenous peoplehood and cultural
stewardship of property). For detailed accounts of how indigenous rights to land have been denied by
colonizing regimes, see BANNER, supra note 36; STUART BANNER, How THE INDIANS LOST THEIR
LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER (2005); ROBERT J. MILLER ET AL., DISCOVERING
INDIGENOUS LANDS: THE DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY INTHE ENGLISH COLONIES (2010). Still, there
remain major questions about the extent to which indigenous claimants will receive remedies, in the
form of actual land restitution and/or damages; whether rights to property will also connote selfgovernance over retained and reclaimed territories; and how such rights will be implemented in a way
that truly benefits indigenous peoples and their neighbors.
252. States' implementations of international legal instruments-whether treaties, declarations,
or otherwise-offer a direct path to effectuating human rights principles. See Hathaway,supra note
209, at 1940 (questioning the impact of treaties). But see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring
the Effects ofHuman Rights Treaties, 14 EuR. J. INT'L L. 171 (criticizing Hathaway's study). Treaties
may not be self-executing, however, and states arguably must ratify them to make them effective and
binding. See, e.g., Lori F. Damrosch, A Comparative Look at Domestic Enforcement of International

Tribunal Judgments, 103 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 39 (2009). Other questions concern the
availability of private enforcement, even in domestic tribunals. See Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria
McElroy & Sara Aronchick Solow, International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in US. Courts, 37

YALE J.INT'L L. 51 (2012) (examining the question of whether treaties conferring private and public
rights are self-executing).
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judicial law-making mechanisms. 253 But this Section also highlights some of
the less formal mechanisms by which nation-states adopt international law. For
example, implementation of international human rights law in nation-states
may occur through "persuasive" means, such as responding to invitations for
submissions on complaints issued by the U.N. Human Rights Committee or the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 254 Strides in human rights also
transpire pursuant to "sociological" transitions, wherein state actors begin to
adopt the beliefs and behaviors of the world community through a process of
"acculturation." 255 For example, it is now a relatively widespread practice for
states to recognize indigenous groups within state borders as "peoples" with
rights to self-determination and cultural survival.
Moreover, as other scholars have documented, the international
indigenous rights movement of the last several decades has played a crucial
role in influencing the actions of nation-states and their propensity to recognize
256
indigenous rights. Thus, even purely domestic laws protecting indigenous
rights-without any direct reference to international law-may, in fact, have
been the products of international influence.257
The trend toward the domestic recognition of international indigenous
rights is apparent, if nascent. As discussed at length in Part I.A., twenty
countries,25 8 including virtually all Latin American countries with significant
indigenous populations, have now ratified ILO Convention 169 concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries.259 And 144 nationstates voted in favor of the U.N. General Assembly's adoption of the UNDRIP
in 2007, with several of the abstentions and all of the four votes in opposition
subsequently changing their position. As discussed elsewhere, regional bodies
have also played a vital role in advancing indigenous rights at the domestic
level.260

See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 114-15.
254. As Helfer and Slaughter point out, the Commission received over 6,600 petitions from
1997 until 2005, and the rate of submissions was rising; the nature of the Commission's work means
that it "does much of the heavy judicial lifting for the Inter-American human rights system." Helfer &
Slaughter, supra note 134, at 924.
253.

255.

See,

e.g.,

Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Incomplete Internationalization and

Compliance with Human Rights Law, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 725, 726 (2008) (describing process of
"acculturation"); see also GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 30, at 21-37 (distinguishing "material
inducement," "persuasion," and "acculturation").
256.

See Siegfried Wiessner, Re-Enchanting the World: Indigenous Peoples' Rights as

Essential Parts of a Holistic Human Rights Regime, 15 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 239, 282
(2010).
257. Id. at 283-84.
258.

Convention No. 169, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org

/indigenous/Conventions/nol69/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
259. See Xanthaki, supra note 238, at 29.
260. See id. at 32-34 (discussing the Inter-American system and the African system).
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Despite these and other advancements, however, critical questions remain
about the implementation of indigenous peoples' rights into domestic law.261
Though relatively few, there are important examples. In 2007, for example,
Bolivia became the first nation to expressly incorporate UNDRIP into domestic
law.262 In 2008, Japan recognized the Ainu as indigenous people and directly
263
cited UNDRIP in the resolution.
Less directly, some states have recognized indigenous rights in actions
that, albeit without citation to international law, hint at emerging global norms.
For example, numerous national constitutions contain protections for
indigenous peoples' rights. The constitutions of Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, and
Ecuador, among others, articulate protections for indigenous peoples that align
with those set forth in ILO 169 and/or UNDRIP, even if they do not expressly
reference those instruments.264
In 2007, the Supreme Court of Belize became the first national high court
265
to cite the UNDRIP2. In Aurelio Cal et al. v. Belize, the claimants sought
redress for the government's failures "to recognize, protect and respect their
customary land rights" based on "the traditional land use and occupation of the
Maya people." 266 In short, they argued that indigenous land rights constitute
legitimate property rights in Belize. In ruling for the Maya, the Court cited to
sources including Belize's own constitution, opinions of regional human rights
systems, and the UNDRIP. 267 The Court acknowledged that because the
UNDRIP is a declaration, and because Belize had not ratified ILO 169, both
documents comprised, at most, nonbinding instruments of customary
Yet, "where these resolutions or Declarations contain
international law.
principles of general international law," the Court wrote, "states are not
expected to disregard them." 269 In sum, the Court found that the defendants
were bound by domestic and international law "to respect the rights to and
,,270
interests of the claimants as members of the indigenous Maya community.

261.
262.
263.
Work: The
264.

See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 114.
LEY No. 3760 DE 7 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 2007 (Bol.).
Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Making the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Challenge Ahead, in Reflections on UNDRIP, supra note 25, at 154.
See, e.g., CONsTITUCION DE 2009 (Bol.); see also ANAYA, supra note 1, at 114-15. In

another example, the Philippines passed human rights legislation in the Indigenous Peoples' Rights
Act of 1997, Rep. Act No. 8371 (Oct. 29, 1997), available at http://www.gov.ph/1997/10/29/republic
-act-no-8371.
265. Aurelio Cal v. Belize, Supreme Court of Belize (Claims No. 171 and 172 of 2007) (Oct.
18,2007).
266.
268.

Id.T2.
Id. 1131.
Id.IN130-31.

269.
270.

Id 131.
Id.1134.

267.
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In other nation-states, recent judicial decisions reflect similar indigenous
rights principles.2 7 1 In 2004, the South African Constitutional Court ruled that
South African law recognized traditional land tenure systems and land rights of
indigenous communities.272 In 2006, the Botswana High Court acknowledged
the land rights of San hunter-gatherers, relying on principles that map onto
those embodied in the UNDRIP, though full and fair implementation of the
decision has not been realized.273 In 2013, the Constitutional Court of Indonesia
held that the state could no longer assert ownership of "customary" forestS274
because the forests were "located in the territories of indigenous people" and
therefore "were part of indigenous rights."275 Despite real challenges to
implementation of these decisions, there is hope that national courts will
continue to draw on international principles when adjudicating indigenous
rights.276
In addition to these legislative matters and judicial decisions, the
executive branches of numerous states have invited the Special Rapporteur on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to conduct on-site visits and to investigate and
report on the situation of indigenous peoples living within a state's borders.277
These visits can only occur with the consent and cooperation of the national
governments, thereby engaging the state in the review of its treatment of
indigenous peoples.278 In recent years, the Rapporteur has visited Botswana,
Brazil, Nepal, the United States, Canada, and dozens of other countries,
resulting in the development of a major body of U.N. reports on indigenous
peoples' circumstances vis-A-vis international standards and state treatment

271.

See Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 C.L.R. 1, 1-2 (recognizing Australian

aboriginal land rights pursuant to native conceptions of land ownership and title).
272.

Alexkor Ltd v. Richtersveld Cmnty. 2003 (5) SA 460 (CC) at 38-39, 50, available at

http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2003/18.html.
273. See Xanthaki, supra note 238, at 34 (discussing Sesana & ors v Attorney General
(52/2002) [2006] BWHC 1); BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: BOTSWANA (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl

/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135939.htm (criticizing the government's lackluster implementation of the ruling).
274.

See Nadya Natahadibrata, Government Recognizes Customary Forests, JAKARTA POST,

May 18, 2013, at 1, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/05/18/government
-recognizes-customary-forests.html.
275. See Abdon Nababan, Govt Urgedto Resolve Problems with Indigenous People,JAKARTA
POST, May 28, 2013, at 2, available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/05/28/govt-urged
-resolve-problems-with-indigenous-people.html.
276. See Xanthaki, supra note 238, at 34.
277. See Country Reports, JAMES ANAYA: UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/list/country-reports (last visited Nov. 10,
2013).
278. See Statement by Professor S. James Anaya, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, 8th Sess. U.N. Permanent Forum
on Indigenous Issues, New York, May 20, 2009, page 5, available at http://unsr.jamesanaya.org
/statements/statement-of-special-rapporteur-to-un-permanent-forum-on-indigenous-issues-2009.
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across the globe.279 And numerous states have long participated in the U.N.
Human Rights Committee's general reporting procedures.
As for the United States, the State Department has indicated that while the
UNDRIP is non-binding, it has "moral and political force." 2 o The State
Department's approach has been to identify the programs of the United States
that it believes already comply with standards articulated in the UNDRIP
(rather than outlining areas for reform),28 1 including federal-tribal
"consultation," "redress" for property losses in the federal courts, and funding
and technical support for economic development and health care. 2 82 In March
2013, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, which oversees many
indigenous sacred sites, expressed its support for the UNDRIP and announced
specific plans to bring its activities into compliance. 283 While no federal or state
court in the United States has yet relied on the UNDRIP in any decision, many
party briefs have cited it as reflective of global principles of indigenous human
284
Perhaps exemplifying jurisgenesis via acculturation, the State
rights law.
Department has emphasized, "the United States is committed to serving as a
model in the international community in promoting and protecting the
collective rights of indigenous peoples as well as the human rights of all
individuals."285
Without doubt, domestic implementation of indigenous peoples' human
rights law around the globe is only beginning and faces serious challenges. But
jurisgenesis is present and observable. Increased commitment to indigenous
rights in domestic constitutions, court decisions, and legislation-and now the
basis for a global protest movement-provide grounds for optimism around
meaningful implementation of indigenous human rights law across the range of
coercive, persuasive, and acculturative activities.286
279. See Country Reports,supra note 277.
280. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1, available at http://www.state.gov
/documents/organization/184099.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) [hereinafter ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S.
SUPPORT FOR UNDRIP].
281. See generally id
282. See generally id.
283. See Rob Capriccioso, FederalAgency Supports UNDRIP: A New Era in Tribal-Federal

Relations?, INDIAN COUNTRY (June 3, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013
/06/03/federal-agency-supports-undrip-new-era-tribal-federal-relations-149676.

284. Cf Marrakush Soc. v. N.J. State Police, No. 09-2518 (JBS), 2009 WL 2366132, at *6
n. 17 (D.N.J. July 30,2009) (noting that UNDRIP is a declaration and not a binding instrument).
285.
286.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR UNDRIP, supra note 280, at 2.
See Setting the Standard Domestic Policy Implications of the UN Declaration on the

Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 112th Cong. (2011);
Idle No More: Stop the Harper Government's Attack on Indigenous Canadians,GLOBAL RESEARCH

(Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.globalresearch.calidle-no-more-stop-the-harper-governments-attack-on
-indigenous-canadians/5323274 (invoking the UNDRIP in indigenous protest movement of 20122013).
Going forward, even where international human rights law is implemented in states-and for that
matter, tribes-there will remain important empirical questions about whether and to what extent legal
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C. Human Rights in IndigenousLegal Systems

This Section considers the influence of international human rights law and
indigenous legal norms on one another, especially in lawmaking and advocacy
by tribal nations and other indigenous governments. We focus on "indigenous
legal systems," by which we mean internal lawmaking and governance of
indigenous communities themselves.
287
Indigenous peoples have always had their own systems of law. Though
too often those systems of law have been disregarded or suppressed by
colonizing nations, today indigenous self-governance is ascending in many
communities. Indian tribes in the United States retain inherent but limited rights
of self-governance over their reservation lands and tribal members and exercise
these through various forms of tribal government. 288 In Canada, while national
law significantly circumscribed First Nations' self-governance rights in the
1800s, there have been new opportunities for indigenous self-governance,
including the creation of Nunavut, a self-governing territory.289 In Latin
America, several national constitutions recognize some degree of indigenous
territorial autonomy.290 In Panama and Colombia, for example, some
indigenous communities maintain collectively-owned land bases, governed by
indigenous councils according to traditional customary practices. 291
During this contemporary resurgence in indigenous self-governance,292
and as part of the continuation of tribal lawmaking since time immemorial,
changes improve living conditions for indigenous peoples. To that end, empirical work about the
situation of indigenous peoples in states around the world, including the Human Rights Council's
Periodic Review, the Special Rapporteur's Country Reports, and the Permanent Forum's studies will
all be critically important assessment tools. See ANAYA, supra note 1, at 105-09.
287. See, e.g., MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 67-84 (2011)
(surveying the history of tribal governments and tribal justice systems).
288. See Riley, Governance, supra note 18.
289. See Thomas J Courchene, Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada, in PAPERS ON
PARLIAMENT NO. 21-PARLIAMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: SOME ISSUES OF INTEREST 6 (1993),
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/pubs/pops/pop2l/cO3.pdf (noting that Nunavut
relies on a public governance model not limited to Native people).
290. See, e.g., Willem Assies, Two Steps Forward,One Step Back: Indigenous Peoples and
Autonomies in Latin America, in AUTONOMY, SELF-GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN INDIVIDED SOCIETIES 180, 186 (Marc Weller
& Stefan Wolff eds., 2005). For a broader study of the recognition of indigenous rights and interests in
Latin American constitutions, see Gonzalo Aguilar et al., The Constitutional Recognition of
Indigenous Peoples in Latin America, 2 PACE INT'L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION 44 (2010),
http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=101 7&context=pilronline.
291. See Assies, supra note 290, at 186-89.
292. For popular media accounts, see, for example, David Akin, The Successes and Failures
for Self-Governance for Canada's First Nations, TORONTO SUN (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.
torontosun.com/2013/01/24/the-successes-and-failures-of-self-governance (surveying self-governance
across several First Nations in Canada); Mark Betancourt, GuaraniPeople vs. Repsol: The Importance
ofIndigenous Self-Determination, FIRST PEOPLES WORLDWIDE (May 8, 2013), http://firstpeoples.org
/wp/guarani-people-vs-repsol-the-importance-of-indigenous-self-determination (describing challenges
of self-government experienced by the Guarani people in Bolivia and certain initiatives to enhance
traditional and contemporary self-governance among indigenous peoples).
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indigenous peoples have proven remarkably adept at incorporating law and
practices from other sources, while attempting to keep true to indigenous
values.293 In some instances, indigenous peoples, through their governments
and other institutions, are turning to international sources, along with their own
tribal norms, to illuminate and ensure human rights for their own people.
We see two interrelated dynamics occurring when indigenous legal
systems engage with international human rights law. First, we see the diffusion
of international human rights norms in indigenous communities. Second, and
perhaps even more powerfully, we also see the recovery and revitalization of
indigenous peoples' own human rights norms.
1. A BriefSurvey ofIndigenous Engagement with InternationalHuman Rights
Law: InternationalandIndigenous Norms

After the U.N. General Assembly adopted the UNDRIP in 2007,
indigenous peoples around the world followed suit. In Canada, the Assembly of
First Nations endorsed the UNDRIP in 2007.294 In the United States, tribal
nations such as the Pit River Tribe and Gila River Tribe, among others, have
done the same.295 More broadly, tribal governments have drawn on the
principles and pronouncements of other human rights instruments, U.N. bodies,
and international human rights systems in creating laws at the tribal level. We
have uncovered several examples to demonstrate this phenomenon, including
tribal constitutions and codes manifesting human rights language.296 Below we
293. Throughout history, there have often been jurisgenerative moments when European and
indigenous laws have come into contact. See, e.g., Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Introductionto EUROPEAN
EXPANSION AND LAW: THE ENCOUNTER OF EUROPEAN AND INDIGENOUS LAW IN 19TH- AND 20THCENTURY AFRICA AND ASIA 1, 5-6, 11-13 (W.J. Mommsen & J.A. de Moor eds., 1992). More
contemporarily, American Indians in the United States have engaged in jurisgenerative lawmaking
when they interpret federal laws, such as the Indian Civil Rights Act. See Mark D. Rosen, Evaluating
Tribal Courts' Interpretationsof the Indian Civil Rights Act, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT
FORTY, supra note 18, at 275 (surveying the jurisprudence of tribal courts as authoritative interpreters
of ICRA). While these points overlap somewhat with our project here, our focus is on the
jurisgenerative process with respect to indigenous human rights in indigenous, domestic, and
international forums.
294. See Implementing the UNDRIP,ASSEMBLY OF FIRST NATIONS, http://www.afn.ca/index
.php/en/policy-areas/implementing-the-Undrip (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
295. See Marc Dadigan, Pit River Tribe Endorses UNDRIP, INDIAN COUNTRY (Apr. 10,
2012) (explaining that the Pit River Tribe, Gila River Tribe, and Seminole Tribe have all voted to
endorse the UNDRIP); cf A Resolution Applauding the UnitedStates Governmentfor Endorsing the
United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, COUNCIL OF THE CHEROKEE
NATION, No. R-06-l1 (Dec. 3, 2011), available at https://cherokee.legistar.com/Legislation.aspx
(change the search year to "2011"; search for "R-06-11").
296. See, e.g., LITILE TRAVERSE BAY BANDS OF ODAWA CONST. art. VI (2005), available at
http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/1traverse/tl.pdf ("We, the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians,
speak through this document to assert that we are a distinct nation of Anishinaabek of North America
that possess the right to: self-determination; freely determine our political status; freely pursue our
economic, social, religious and cultural development, and determine our membership, without external
interference. These same rights and principles the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians
acknowledge to be inherent among other peoples, nations and governments throughout the world. We
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describe several tribal court opinions relying on international law and the
creation of human rights bodies within tribal communities that are designed to
specifically deal with indigenous peoples' human rights concerns. As we note
above, these examples reveal both the diffusion of international norms as well
as the recovery of indigenous norms.
Galit Sarfaty's work highlights the experience of the Pimicikamak Cree
Nation in Canada, which incorporated international human rights law into tribal
governance. She points to the case as an example of "international norm
diffusion" and the process of "mediation" among local, state, and international
law. 2 97 The Pimicikamak Cree occupy a reserve north of Winnipeg where they
have long enjoyed a subsistence lifestyle, operated by consensus style
government, and have spoken Cree as the language of the community. With the
benefit of a 1995 law permitting self-government agreements, the Cree began
to reformulate their internal governing systems. They deliberately chose at that
time to draw from their own traditional law, as well as Canadian and
international law. According to Sarfaty, the Cree had learned about
international human rights law largely through their campaign to expose
violations of their rights by Canada and hydroelectric companies in the 1980s
and 1990s, through advocacy to the United Nations and other international
bodies. As Sarfaty puts it, "Having been exposed to international human rights
norms through their political mobilization, the Cree began to incorporate these
norms into both their official discourse (e.g., their constitution, laws, and
formal statements to external parties) and their local political discourse."298
In the process of developing "modern governance" within the framework
of their "[t]raditional ways," 29 9 the Cree first revived and updated traditional
institutions, such as their consensus-based dispute resolution format and its
reliance on the values of min-oo-puh-now (harmony), mi-nah-sin (beauty), and
mi-nah-yaw-win (well-being).oo At the same time, they kept and improved
upon certain of the Indian Act's institutions, including the appointment of a
Chief and Council. Perhaps most remarkably, the Cree restructured their law to
ensure that it recognized individual and collective rights of the community,
with particular attention to the rights of women and youth.30' Accordingly, the
recognize their sovereignty and pledge to maintain relations with those peoples, nations and
governments who acknowledge those same fundamental human rights and principles, and who
recognize the sovereignty of the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians."); NORTHERN
ARAPAHO CODE, 7 N.A.C. § 401 (2004), available at http://www.northernampaho.com/sites
/northemarapaho.com/files/NA Code Title 7 Peacemaker 11-4-04.pdf (describing grounds for an order
terminating peacemaking process as "[c]onduct by the Peacemaker in the peacemaking process which
is degrading, inhuman, dangerous, assaultive or otherwise violative of basic human rights").
297. See Galit A. Sarfaty, International Norm Diffusion in the Pimicikamak Cree Nation: A
Model ofLegal Mediation, 48 HARV. INT'L L. J. 441, 442-45 (2007).

298.
299.
300.

Id. at 474.
Id. at 472.
Id at 471.

301.

Id at475.
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"First Written Law" transferred legislative power from the Council of Elders to
a new Women's Council and Youth Council. 02 Notably, the Cree also
expressly referenced the ICCPR and ICESR, the Canadian Charter, and Cree
law in their new constitution.
Per Sarfaty's account, the Cree appear to have been at the forefront of
integrating tribal with international legal sources, moving toward a revitalized
indigenous government that is responsive to contemporary circumstances.
According to the Assembly of First Nations, the Cree now have "a model of
jurisdiction that seeks to reconcile
accountable governance based on inherent
303
tradition with modem circumstances."
American Indian tribes too have participated in the revitalization of tribal
government, with attention to the need to address vestiges of colonialism,
including the federal government's use of tribal institutions as agents of
assimilation. For example, today's tribal courts have authority over certain civil
and criminal matters arising on reservations, as delineated in tribal statutory
and common law. 304 These courts, however, bring complicated histories to their
work: some courts evolved directly from traditional tribal dispute resolution
systems, while others were created by the federal government to adjudicate its
special Indian regulatory law on reservations beginning in the 1880S.305 These
courts of Indian offenses had the task of enforcing federal laws, including those
that expressly forbade and punished the practice of Indian religions.306 Tribal
courts have also been highly influenced by federal decisions and statutes that
regulate their civil and criminal jurisdiction.307
With those legacies weighing heavily, today's tribal courts work toward
being internally responsive to tribal needs and norms, as well as representing
institutional legitimacy to outsiders, a set of challenges that has been aptly
explored by Matthew Fletcher.308 One aspect of the struggle to decolonize tribal
courts is to revitalize traditional customary law. For example, after years of
302.

Id. at 475-76.

303. Id at 470 (citing the Assembly of First Nations' description of the Pimicikamak Cree
government).
304. See FLETCHER, supra note 287, at 67-92; Catherine T. Struve, Sovereign Litigants:
Native American Nations in Court, 55 VILL. L. REv. 929, 934-35 (2010).
305. See FLETCHER, supra note 287, at 67-92; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Toward a
Theory ofIntertribalandIntratribalCommon Law, 43 HOUS. L. REv. 701 (2006).
306. See REPORT OF COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS W.A. JONES, OCT. 16, 1902,
reprinted in 2 WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE UNITED STATES: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 726-27 (1973).
307. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 40304, 447-531 (6th ed. 2011).
308. For a leading series of articles on these challenges, see Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
Rethinking Customary Law in Tribal Court Jurisprudence,13 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57 (2007); Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court'sLegal Culture War Against Tribal Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM.
RTS. L. REv. 93 (2007); Fletcher, supra note 305; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Looking to the East: The
Stories of Modern Indian People and the Development of Tribal Law, 5 SEATTLE J. FOR Soc. JUST. 1
(2006).
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"borrowing" from neighboring state law to resolve disputes ranging from
family to criminal law, the Navajo Nation Supreme Court has now expressed a
jurisprudential preference for applying Navajo common law over federal and
state sources of law. 309 As Navajo Supreme Court Justice Ray Austin has
explained, this process "involves retrieving ancient tribal values, customs, and
norms and using them to solve contemporary legal issues." 310 Writing from an
Anishinaabe legal perspective, John Borrows describes the process of "drawing
out law" that involves looking to indigenous experience for legal norms and
processes.311 Here we observe that, in the jurisgenerative moment, tribal courts
are also using international human rights law as a tool in decolonizing tribal
court jurisprudence and emphasizing indigenous human rights norms.
In the case of Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres, for example,
the Supreme Court of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians relied in part on
international legal norms to contain the impact of Oliphantv. Suquamish Tribe,
a 1978 U.S. Supreme Court decision that severely limits tribes' ability to
prosecute non-Indians for crimes committed on reservations.312 Deciding that
Oliphant did not prevent the court from hearing a case against a non-Indian,
non-citizen of the United States, the Torres decision drew on tribal and
international law.313 First, the Court looked at the Cherokee Code which
acknowledged that "[t]he Judicial Branch shall not have jurisdiction over
matters in which the exercise of jurisdiction has been specifically prohibited by
a binding decision of the United States Supreme Court, the United States Court
of Appeals or by an Act of Congress."3 14 A thorough review of these sources,
including Oliphant,revealed that the tribe's jurisdiction had not been abrogated
with respect to asserting criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who are not
U.S. citizens. As the court wrote, "The Cherokee Nation had such jurisdiction
Preserving this jurisdiction was important,
in 1492; it has it today."
according to the court, "to protect the safety, health, economic development,
liberty, and the general welfare of the Eastern Band ... and all other people

309. See, e.g., In re Validation of Marriage of Francisco, 6 Navajo Rptr. 134, 135-36 (1989)
(ruling according to Navajo law, rejecting "outside law").
310. See AUSTIN, supra note 23, at xvii (describing this process as "a lesson embedded in the
Navajo Creation Scripture and Journey Narratives," in which the Navajo's oral stories teach humans
about how to acquire knowledge, relate to one another, and adapt to their circumstances).
311. See generally JOHN BORROws, DRAWING OUT LAW: A SPIRIT'S GUIDE (2010).
312. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Beyond the Torres case, the EBIC
Tribal Courts have been engaged in a process of decolonizing their jurisprudence. See J. Matthew
Martin, The Nature and Extent of the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdictionby the Cherokee Supreme
Court: 1823-1835, 32 N.C. CENT. L. REv. 27 (2009); J. Matthew Martin, Federal Malpractice in
Indian Country and the "Law of the Place ": A Re-Examination of Williams v. United States Under
ExistingLaw ofthe Eastern Band ofCherokee Indians, 29 CAMPBELL L. REv. 483 (2007).

313.

Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres, 2005 N.C. Cherokee Sup. Ct LEXIS 6.

314.

See id at *5 (citing CHEROKEE CODE

§ 7-2(a) (2001)).

315. Id. at *6; see also id. at *7-8 (Philo, J.) (concurring) (providing a spirited exposition of
the discriminatory quality of federal laws that limit tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians).
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who live, work or visit on Tribal lands."' 16 In addition, the court noted that its
holding, "and the federal policy of self-determination of Indian tribes, is
consistent with and supported by established norms of customary international
law," including anti-discrimination principles, as well as "the traditions,
customs and culture of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians."317
In another case, Selena v. HualapaiTribe, the Hualapai Court of Appeals
considered arguments that, by allowing a child's parent to participate in court
proceedings, the trial court had improperly handled the testimony of a child
witness leading to the defendant's criminal conviction in a matter involving
sexual assault.318 The appellate court noted the challenge of preserving the
well-being of a ten-year-old child who had expressed fear at facing the
defendant in court, while at the same time preserving the defendant's
constitutional rights. 319 In resolving the question, the court relied on the
Hualapai Law & Order Code's choice-of-law provision, which allows the
Hualapai courts to "look to other legal systems for guidance where Hualapai
written or common law does not cover the matter in question." 320 Thus, the
appellate court set up the jurisgenerative moment by first establishing its ability
to look to extraterritorial law for guidance when Hualapai laws are silent. The
Court ultimately borrowed from the International Criminal Court Rules, which
more leniently allow for the presence of a "support person" during proceedings
for child witnesses. 32 1
These cases provide an anecdotal glimpse into how tribal courts are
interpreting and revitalizing tribal law through the lens of international law to
better serve the needs of the reservation polity.
2. The Recovery and Revitalization ofIndigenous Human Rights in Two
Communities: The Navajo Nation and EasternBand of Cherokee Indians

In this Section, we describe how two U.S. Indian Tribes-the Navajo
Nation and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians-are engaging, developing,

316.

Id. at *6.

317. Id at *7 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1990); International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and other sources). In this regard, the tribal
court opinion implicitly took a position in the debate on whether customary international law is a
source of federal law. See Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: International
Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 463 (1997) (arguing for customary

law as an aspect of federal law). But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, III, The Current
Illegitimacy of InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997) (arguing

against Goodman and Jinks's position); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
InternationalLaw as FederalCommon Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REv.

815 (1997).
318. See Selana v. Hualapai Tribe, No. 2008-AP-005, HTC No. 2007-CR-282ABC (Hualapai
Ct. App. Dec. 17,2008).
319.

See id.

320.

Id at4 (citing Bender v. Hualapai Tribe, 2005-AP-01 1, 5 (Jul. 16,2007)).

321.

Id at 5.
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and revitalizing human rights through a jurisgenerative process. This process
embraces tribal and international sources in ways that portend change and
growth in both indigenous and international advocacy. Here we identify and
analyze examples that have not yet, to our knowledge, been discussed in the
legal literature.
We observe that the experience of human rights emerging from the
Navajo Nation, the Eastern Band of Cherokees, and other communities is not
merely an example of "norm entrepreneurship" 322 or "norm diffusion," 3 23 in
which worldly activists bring new concepts to tribal communities.324 In these
examples, we believe we are seeing something potentially more reciprocal,
more vibrant, and, in fact, more indigenous. While tribes are certainly
embracing international human rights concepts like "self-determination," as
suggested in the Navajo example, they are simultaneously uncovering their
own human rights norms. They are, in turn, applying these norms, in
conjunction with other sources, to internal and external advocacy, as well as
toward the goals of decolonization and revitalization, in tribal, domestic, and
international forums alike.
a. The Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission: Race Relations, Sacred
Sites, and Water Rights
The Navajo Nation is a federally recognized American Indian tribe that
resides on a reservation of 27,425 square miles stretching across the states of
New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, and Colorado. The Navajo Nation has 298,000
citizens, approximately 173,000 of whom live on the reservation, along with
several thousand non-Navajo residents, including Anglos, Hopis, and others.
The reservation is located within the treaty-guaranteed, traditional territory of
the Navajo, among their four sacred mountains.
For decades, the Navajo Nation has been a leader in developing legal
institutions and substantive law, with an express goal of imbuing contemporary
practice with Navajo values and processes.325 The Navajo Nation operates a
three-branch form of government, with popularly elected legislators and
executives as well as an appointed judiciary.32 6 Navajo traditional or customary
322.

See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home,

35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 646-47 (1998) (arguing that reliance on "norm entrepreneurs," including
thought leaders who mobilize popular opinion, is one way to "bring international law home").
323. See Sarfaty, supra note 297, at 443.
324. See id. at 441-42 (querying what happens when indigenous activists return home after
trips to the U.N. in Geneva when they have "learned, employed, and even influenced international
norms").
325. See AUsTIN, supra note 23; see also Ezra Rosser, Displacing the Judiciary: Customary
Law and the Threat of a Defensive Tribal Council: A Book Review of Raymond D. Austin, Navajo

Courts and Navajo Common Law: A Tradition of Tribal Self-Governance (2009), 34 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 379 (2010).
326. See Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative ofSovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox ofthe Domestic
Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1165-66 (2004).
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law, as well as the legislative code and judicial decisions are all vibrant aspects
of Navajo governance.327 In 2006, the legislative council of the Navajo Nation
created an entity broadly devoted to human rights-the Navajo Nation Human
Rights Commission (NNHRC)-which is obligated to "address discriminatory
actions against citizens of the Navajo Nation." 328 Toward this end, the NNHRC
receives complaints, conducts investigations, gathers information, and engages
in advocacy work. It advocates for Navajo human rights, especially in areas of
discrimination, sacred sites access, forced relocation, and unexplained deaths,
through communication with the local, state, and federal governments, as well
329
as with international human rights tribunals and organizations.
The NNHRC takes a deeply integrative approach to human rights. In
terms of substantive law, the NNHRC draws primarily from Navajo law,
particularly the Dind principles of Sa'a Naaghai Bik'e Hozhoo, Hashkieji,

H6zh66ji and K'9: "being resilient, content, disciplined and maintaining
peaceful relationships with all creation." 330 The Commission's work also relies
on international law principles, even in some cases to critique the positive law
within the Navajo Nation. Regarding self-determination, for example, the
NNHRC draws on Articles 3 and 4 of the UNDRIP, which define selfdetermination as an attribute of indigenous peoplehood. 33 1 It contrasts this with
the Navajo Nation's own legislative code, which describes self-determination
merely as a "goal,"332 and has, accordingly, called for legislative reform within
the Navajo Nation to give greater strength to the Navajo Nation's own
articulation of the term.3 33
This example crystallizes our understanding of how even internal Navajo
Nation power brokers can be, and are, challenged by a distinctly tribal human
rights commission that is fueled both by the Navajo cosmologies, as well as the
force and persuasion of international human rights. This sits in direct contrast
to the specter of the insulated, isolated paideic nomos that scholars had
feared-one that serves to only reify power and speak to the viewpoints and
rights of "cultural elites."334 We see this convergence of the UNDRIP with
various sources of Navajo law as marking a distinctive, jurisgenerative
moment, wherein the Navajo government is urged-oftentimes with the

327. See AUSTIN, supra note 23, at xx-xxi.
328. An Act Relating to Human Services, Economic Development, Judiciary, and
Intergovernmental Relations; Approving the Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission, 2 N.N.C.
§ 921 (2006), available at http://www.nnhrc.navajo-nsn.gov/docs/Oct2006RESOLUTION.pdf.
329. See Forced Relocation, NAVAJO NATION HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, http://www
.nnhrc.navajo-nsn.gov/forcedRelocation.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
330. See NNHRC MiusionlVision, supra note 10.
331. See Self Determination, NAVAJO NATION HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, http://www
.nnhrc.navajo-nsn.gov/selffletermination.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
332. See id.
333. See id.
334. See Sunder, supra note 147, at 553; see also Resnik, supra note 24.
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conversation occurring, quite literally, in Navajo-to re-engage its own
traditional, political vision.
The NNHRC's investigative and advocacy projects similarly reveal
jurisgenerative trends. The NNHRC's initial project, involving the investigation
of hate crimes against Navajo people occurring in border towns, integrated
tribal, domestic, and international norms. The NNHRC's 2008-2009 report
began with a recitation of Navajo values that had guided the NNHRC in taking
victim assessment testimony from over 400 individuals. The report emphasized
that speeches at council meetings must be guided by k'e, "the 'glue' that creates
and binds relationships between people." 335 The report also indicated a reliance
on UNDRIP's principles of equality, cultural difference, non-discrimination,
and indigenous human

rights 336 in assessing the interconnected, deeply

contextual problems of Navajo homelessness, loss of identity and culture,
vulnerability to discrimination (including in consumer transactions, education,
and employment), and violent crime.
The NNHRC has also addressed sacred sites protection, especially with
respect to the infamous case of Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service.337 In that
case, the Ninth Circuit upheld the U.S. Forest Service's decision to permit the
use of treated sewage effluent in San Francisco Peaks ski area snowmaking,
which desecrated one of the Navajo people's holiest mountains, in the face of
claims alleging violations of religious freedoms and environmental rights.338
Noting the losses experienced by tribal members when prevented from
accessing sites to "conduct prayers, ceremonies and present offerings," an
NNHRC report called on both the city of Flagstaff and the Navajo Nation itself
to take a stronger stance to prioritize Navajo religion and culture over
competing economic opportunities.33 9 The NNHRC's assessment drew on
UNDRIP Articles 11 and 12, which guarantee indigenous peoples religious and
cultural freedoms, with special protections for access to sacred sites. 340 It also
cited "Din6 Fundamental Law, the Dind Bi Beehaz 'canniiBitsd Sildi, adopted

and enacted as the primary law of the Navajo Nation in 2002,"341 which
specifically identifies and protects the San Francisco Peaks as a "living
mountain."342

335. See NAvAJO NATION HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, ASSESSING RACE RELATIONS
BETWEEN NAvAJOS AND NON-NAVAJOS 2008-2009: A REvIEW OF BORDER TOWN RACE
RELATIONS, at ii (2010), http://www.nnhrc.navajo-nsn.gov/docs/NewsRptResolution/071810
Assessing Race Relations Between Navajos and Non-Navajos.pdf [hereinafter NNHRC, ASSESSING
RACE RELATIONS].
336. Id.
337. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008).
338. Id.
339. NNHRC, ASSESSING RACE RELATIONS, supra note 335, at xiii.
340. Id.
341. Id. at xiii n.3.
342. Id at xiii n.4.
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The NNRHC took its claims a step further in 2010, submitting a formal
complaint to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples. 3 4 3 The
complaint alleged that the United States violated international law and the
human rights of the Navajo people through its failure to protect the San
Francisco Peaks. Invoking the language of international human rights
discourse, the NNHRC Executive Director stated, "The Navajo people is a part
of the world community and the world community has set standards for a good
reason[.] ... The United States must be responsible and abide by international
standards that protect the human rights of Navajos." 344 The Special Rapporteur,
in turn, referenced the NNHRC's complaint about the San Francisco Peaks in
his recent country report on the United States. 345
In one of its most ambitious moves, the NNHRC opposed proposed
federal legislation that would settle Navajo and Hopi claims to water rights on
the Little Colorado River. The proposed legislation was supported by Navajo
Nation President Ben Shelly, while the NNHRC's advocacy on this issue was
perceived as representing "the people," especially grassroots groups. 346 The
NNHRC opposed the federal, state, and tribal governments, as well as arguably
self-interested corporate players. According to the NNHRC, Navajo people
were granted insufficient notice of and participation in the legislative process in
violation of the UNDRIP's call for "free, prior and informed consent" by
indigenous peoples to measures affecting their interests. 34 7
Relying on UNDRIP's Article 26, the NNHRC report asserted that
"[w]ater is a Navajo natural resource," belonging to "[i]ndigenous peoples."34 8
And, in this case, it belonged to the Din6 people in particular. The NNHRC
elaborated from Navajo tradition that water and other resources "are
fundamental, sacred and spiritual sustenance to the Din6 people since time
immemorial," and are linked to religion, culture, sustenance, clan

343. See NNHRC Passes Legislation Requesting President Obana to Suspend Forest
Service's Snowbowl Permit, NAvAJO-HOPI OBSERVER (Sept 20, 2011), http://nhonews.com/Main
.asp?SectionlD-l&SubSectionlD=1&ArticlelD=13932.
344. Id. (quoting Leonard Gorman of the NNHRC).
345. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, James Anaya, on the Situation of Indigenous Peoples in the U.S., 21st Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/21/47/Add.1 (Aug. 30, 2012), http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/docs/countries/2012-report-usa-a
-hrc-21-47-addl-en.pdf.
346. See NAVAJO NATION HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, RESOLUTION OF THE NAVAJO NATION
HuMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (May 18, 2012), available at http://www.nnhrc.navajo-nsn.gov/docs
/NewsRptResolution/Resolutions/NNHRCMAY-1 8-12.pdf [hereinafter NNHRC RESOLUTION].
347. Id 1 8. The NNHRC Executive Director later softened allegations ofFPIC violations by
the Navajo Nation. See Press Release, Navajo Nations Human Rights Commission, Statement by the
Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission Executive Director to Clarify Free, Prior and Informed

Consent (Apr. 17, 2012), available at http://www.nnhrc.navajo-nsn.gov/PressReleases/2012/Apr
/041712_Statement byNNHRCsExecutiveDirectorto clarify Free,_Prior andInformed
Consent.pdf.
348. See NNHRC RESOLunON, supra note 346, 14.
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identifications, and Navajo ceremonies. 349 As the NNHRC explained, "Water is
in the Din6 clans such as T6 'dhdni, Tcbqqha, To'aheedliinii, Tdhdich'iinii,
Tdtsohnii, Td Baazhni'dzhi, to name a few."350 For the Din6, their peoples
originated "around the four corners region which is the Ding female heart of the
earth." 35 1
On May 18, 2012, the NNHRC adopted a resolution opposing the NavajoHopi Little Colorado River Water Rights Settlement Act of 2012 on grounds
that it violated the human rights of the Din6 people by denying them adequate
participation in the water resource decision. 35 2 The NNRHC called for all
elected officials to oppose the measure as well. On July 5, 2012, the Navajo
Nation Council voted 15-6 against the settlement and federal enabling
legislation.353
The work of the NNHRC illustrates the jurisgenerative moment in
indigenous peoples' human rights. The NNHRC thus far has embraced a
capacious set of claims and has drawn fluidly from multiple sources of law to
define human rights for the Dine people. Notably, the NNHRC does not seem
to struggle over some of the dichotomous categories, such as individual and
tribal rights, that so fixate many commentators. Its complaint process allows for
the investigation of human rights violations by a number of possible parties,
including police, courts, and schools, both within and outside the Navajo
Nation. 3 54 In all of its endeavors, the NNHRC has advanced the concept and
practice of human rights in ways that draw from both Navajo and international
law, exhibiting growth and reflecting indigenous values in the law-making
process.
b. The EasternBand of Cherokee Indians: Responding to Violence Against
Women
The Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians (the "Eastern Band" or "Eastern
Cherokee"), primarily located on the Qualla Boundary in North Carolina, is a
tribe of over 13,000 members, of whom approximately 9,000 reside on tribal
land."5 The Eastern Band's government operates pursuant to a tribal charter

349.
350.
351.

Id 5.
Id.
Id.

352.

See generally id.

353. See Felicia Fonseca, Navajo CouncilRejects Water Rights Settlement, AZCENTRAL.COM
(July 6, 2012), http://www.azcentral.con/news/20120705PNIO706-wir-arizona-navajo-water-rights
-settlement-rejected.html.
354. See Complaint Form, NAVAJO NATION HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, available at
http://www.nnhrc.navajo-nsn.gov/docs/Forms/NNHRCComplaint_FormNNHRCRelease
Form.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2013).
355. See generally JOHN R. FINGER, CHEROKEE AMERICANS: THE EASTERN BAND OF
CHEROKEES INTHE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991) (providing more information on the community).
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and code and has an elected council and principal chief, as well as a separate
judiciary.3 56
In 2011, the Eastern Band hosted United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women, Rashida Manjoo, during her country visit to the
United States. 5 Manjoo's visit occurred during a period of unprecedented
national and global attention on the issue of American Indian women's safety
and justice. According to Congressional findings, 34 percent of American
Indian and Alaska Native women will be raped in their lifetimes, and
39 percent of them will be subject to domestic violence.358 These rates exceed
those experienced by any other population of women in the United States.359
The experience of the Eastern Cherokees in combating these problems suggests
a role for international human rights law in empowering indigenous women to
recover and revitalize norms protecting women in contemporary circumstances,
and to seek reform at the tribal, national, and international levels.
The causes of violence against American Indian women are complex and
numerous.360 Scholars generally agree that many indigenous societies, such as
the Eastern Cherokee, had historical legal and societal mechanisms to protect
women from sexual assault and other forms of violence.361 Yet, the social,
economic, and cultural upheaval experienced by indigenous peoples during
generations of European conquest and colonization severely undermined the
health and well-being of indigenous communities; and as indigenous
communities suffered, indigenous women became more vulnerable to

violence. 3 62
Observers have argued that the Cherokees' matrilineal and matrilocal
social organization and traditional respect for Cherokee women's autonomy

356. See CHEROKEE CODE (2010), availableat http://narf.org/nill/Codes/ebcicode.
357. See Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, Its Causes and Consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo: Mission to the United States of America,
17th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/26/Add.5 (June 6, 2011) [hereinafter Report of Special Rapporteur
Manjoo].

358. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 201(a)(5), 124 Stat. 2261,
2262-63.
359. Id.
360. See Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 121, 123 (2004) (discussing causes of sexual violence in Indian country).
361. See, e.g., Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of Rape Law
Reform andFederalIndian Law, 38 SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 455, 460 (2005) ("Our histories and oral
teachings reveal the effectiveness of these [traditional] justice systems.").
362. See Deer, supra note 360, at 123 n.21; see also Larissa Behrendt, Consent in a (Neo)
Colonial Society: Aboriginal Women as Sexual and Legal 'Other,' 15 AusTL. FEMINIST STUD. 353
(2000); Hannah S. Scott & Rebecca L. Beaman, Sexual Assault Among Aboriginal and NonAboriginal Peoples in a Western Canadian City: A Casefor Including Race When Collecting Crime
Data, I ONLINE J. JUST. STUD., Jan. 2003, http://ojs.uoit.ca/JOURNALbackissues/ojs/html/issues
/1.1/scott-beaman.html. See generally SHARING OUR STORIES OF SURVIVAL: NATIVE WOMEN
SURVIVING VIOLENCE (Sarah Deer et al. eds., 2008).
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historically served to protect women and children from abuse.363 Pre-contact
Cherokee communities were structured around clan identities and kinship
obligations, inherited from one's mother, as well as local town political
organization.364 Women controlled the fields and homes, chose their own
sexual partners, and could divorce them with little disruption. 365 Men, in turn,
were responsible for hunting, warfare, and political activities that often kept
them away from home. These gender roles were reflected in Cherokee oral
stories, which described balance between female and male figures and modeled
the peaceful resolution of disputes between spouses. 3 Yet, the traditional law
and if a
of the Cherokees also provided sanctions for assault and rape,
husband or partner killed his wife, her clan was obligated to seek retribution
from his.368
The cosmology, socioeconomic structure, and dispute resolution systems
of the Cherokees, then, offered protections for women.369 But in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, contact with European governments (and eventually
the federal and state governments of the United States) and other nonCherokees created pressure to consider new forms of government, religion, and
dispute resolution.370 With the ascension of a national governing council, the
abolition of clan law, and new legislation providing for the transmission of
citizenship and property along male (as well as female) family lines, some of
the traditional protections for women dissipated.371 Increasingly violent
incursions of white settlers, the reduction of the Cherokee land base,
introduction of alcohol, religious conversion, and usurpation of tribal
jurisdiction by surrounding states all made it difficult to address social issues
through traditional Cherokee norms and structures. 37 2 At various points, federal
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at 45 (1999).
364. See id.at 42, 94.
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See, e.g., Kana'tiand Selu: Origin of Game and Corn, in JAMES MOONEY, MYTHS OF

THE CHEROKEE 242 (1995); Origin ofStrawberries,in MOONEY, supra,at 259.
367. See RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN TO
COURT 34-39 (1975) (describing sanctions for deviations in spiritual, community, clan, and individual
conduct).
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See, e.g., PERDUE, supra note 363, at 50,52.

369. See id. at 40-57; see also TIYA MILES, TIES THAT BIND: THE STORY OF AN AFROCHEROKEE FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 50-51 (2005) (describing the vulnerability of slave
women who lacked a Cherokee clan for protection).
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24 AM. INDIAN Q. 562 (2000); see also PERDUE,supra note 363, at 56.
371. See PERDUE, supra note 363, at 140-58 (noting nineteenth century changes to Cherokee
governance, property, citizenship, and homicide and their impacts on Cherokee women and society).
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Cherokee family structure" and the contribution of alcohol abuse to violence against Cherokee
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policy makers and churches sought to elevate Cherokee women's "equality" by
encouraging them to take on European gender roles, such as weaving and
sewing, and leave farming for the men. 3 73 At the tribal level, new statutes
codified the rights of married women to own property. 3 74 Notwithstanding the
"cultural persistence" of Cherokee women, 3 75 however, scholars have argued
that the de-stabilization of gender, labor, and cultural norms disrupted the
matrilineality of Cherokee society 76 and may have left women more vulnerable
to domestic violence at key points in the Removal, Civil War, and Allotment
eras.377 Other commentators have reported on the contrast between
contemporary episodes of violence-compounded by the political, economic
and social legacies of federal policies in Indian Country-and what they
describe as the Cherokee "Harmony Ethic."378
In Cherokee communities, as elsewhere in Indian Country, contemporary
rates of rape and domestic violence suffered by Native women suggest a
breakdown, among other things, of traditional indigenous values and clan
structures, caused by conquest and colonization. 379 In the United States,
addressing these issues through tribal justice systems has been difficult in
contemporary times3 80 because of Supreme Court decisions stripping tribal
courts of jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-Indians and federal
statutes diminishing tribal sentencing authority. 382 And while the federal
113-14 (2010) (describing increasing documentation of domestic violence against Cherokee women in
the 1800s).
373. See, e.g., JOHNSTON, supranote 365, at 77, 113, 122.
374.

See PERDUE, supra note 363, at 152-53.

375.

See generally VIRGINIA MOORE CARNEY,
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persistence manifested in Eastern Cherokee women's own speeches and letters dating back to the
1700s, including during key encounters with European and American society).
376. See PERDUE, supranote 363, at 146-47.
377. See, e.g., JOHNSTON, supra note 365, at 77, 113-14, 122-23. For another view pertaining
to the experiences of Cherokee women in Oklahoma, see ROSE STREMLAU, SUSTAINING THE
CHEROKEE FAMILY: KINSHIP AND THE ALLOTMENT OF AN INDIGENOUS NATION (2011) (arguing that

in the 1900s Oklahoma Cherokee families' organization, cultural values, and social and economic
practices allowed them to adapt to private land ownership by incorporating elements of the new system
into existing domestic and community-based economies).
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226-28 (2008) (proposing Congressional changes to the Oliphant rule and ICRA to address the
problem of domestic violence in Indian Country); Jasmine Owens, "Historic"in a Bad Way: How The
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381. See Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
382. For a thorough discussion of congressional limits on tribal criminal punishing authority
via the Indian Civil Rights Act and Public Law 280, see Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne,
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government has law enforcement authority over violent crimes occurring on
reservations, it has a record of declining to exercise this power, creating an
enforcement gap.
It is against this backdrop of escalating rates of sexual assault and
domestic violence against women that the Special Rapporteur made her 2011
visit to Eastern Cherokee. One of her first meetings included instruction about
the traditional legal and social system of the Cherokees.384 Terri Henry, a
Councilwoman in the Eastern Band, explicated the link between United States
Indian policy and contemporary violence in Native communities. She invoked
the federally ordered relocation of the Cherokees to Indian Country in 1838 via
the "Trail of Tears" to emphasize that the "Removal Act legalized the deaths of
thousands of Cherokee."385 Indeed, the Eastern Band of Cherokees are direct
descendants of those who tried to resist the relocation and whose descendants
ultimately rebuilt their society amid the states and citizens that had sought to
expel them. 38 6 Henry explained that the history reveals a legacy of violence and
oppression that lives on in the disparate treatment of Indians in the United
States.387
By the time of the Special Rapporteur's visit, women within the Eastern
Band of Cherokees had for years been trying to address issues of social justice
and cultural revitalization in their community. 388 With respect to violence
against women, several women formed Clan Star Inc. to pursue advocacy
through tribal, federal, and international channels to end violence within the
community by promoting traditional tribal values of respect for all living things

Searchingfor an Exit: The Indian Civil Rights Act and PublicLaw 280, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT AT FORTY, supra note 18, at 247, 249-54.
383. See Kevin K. Washburn, Federal CriminalLaw and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C.
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Country, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1067, 1099-1100 (2010) (arguing that the Major Crimes Act of 1885 is
unconstitutional as applied to Indians in Indian Country today).
384. See UN Expert to Visit Cherokee, North Carolina to Study the Epidemic of Violence
Against Native Women, INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.indianlaw.org
/content/un-expert-visit-cherokee-north-carolina-study-epidemic-violence-against-native-women.
385. See Terri Henry, Restoring Respect for the First Women of This Land, INDIAN LAW
RESOURCE CENTER (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.indianlaw.org/safewomen/restoring-respect-first
-women-land.
386. See Barbara R. Duncan, Introduction to LIVING STORIES OF THE CHEROKEE 1, 7-8
(Barbara R. Duncan ed., 1998) (recounting the story of the Cherokee man "Tsali" who resisted
relocation and then submitted himself for execution (along with his sons) in exchange for the United
States' promise to stop persecuting the Cherokee remaining in the east).
387. Henry, supra note 385.
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and honoring women. 3 89 As Clan Star's mission statement asserts: "any abuse
is not traditional and is not acceptable." 390 Clan Star advocated for national
legislation including the Violence Against Women Act of 2005 and participated
in briefing the Jessica Gonzales case before the Inter-American Court on
Human Rights.391
Tribal government too has addressed violence against women at Eastern
Cherokee. In 2002, the Eastern Band enacted a statute on domestic violence,
which provides avenues to the tribal courts for redress and protections. 392
Forms of relief include final protective orders and temporary ex parte orders in
emergency situations to aid and support victims in numerous respects. 39 3 The
Eastern Band has also enacted enhanced emergency responder, public safety,
judicial, and offender rehabilitation programs. In addition, the tribe has been
involved in advocacy at the national level, supporting the 2010 Tribal Law and
Order Act's (TLOA) enhancement of tribal court sentencing authority. Tribal
leadership also supported the Violence Against Women Act's provisions for
concurrent tribal court jurisdiction over certain domestic violence crimes
committed by non-Indians.394 In 2012, the Eastern Band Tribal Court, acting on
its expanded authority under the TLOA, handed down a four-year sentence for
a domestic violence conviction, one of the longest sentences ever imposed by
the court. 9 Today "Cherokee women have the right as citizens of the Eastern
Band to the protection of their government." 396
As Councilwoman Henry explained, the visit of Special Rapporteur
Manjoo in 2011 gave the Eastern Band an opportunity to showcase tribal
389.

About CSI, CLAN STAR INc., http://www.clanstar.org/about-csi (last visited Nov. 10,

2013).

390. Id
391. See id. Clan Star, Inc. was one of a group of "non-profit organizations and tribal
governments actively working to end the epidemic of violence against American Indian and Alaska
Native women" who participated as amici in the Jessica Gonzales case, joining a brief authored by
attorneys at the Indian Law Resource Center. See Brief for Indian Law Resource Center et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Plaintiff, Gonzales v. United States, Case 1490-05, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 52/07, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.130 Doc. 22, rev. 1 (2007), available at http://indianlaw.org
/sites/default/files/resources/final%20with/o2Osign%2Oons 12Nov08_amicus%20brief%20gonzales%
20v.%20US.pdf. See generally Caroline Bettinger-L6pez, Human Rights at Home: Domestic Violence

as a Human Rights Violation, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 19 (2008) (discussing the Jessica
Gonzales case).

392. See CHEROKEE CODE, ch. 50B (2010), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes
/ebcicode/50bviolence.pdf.
393. Id § 50B-7.
394. The Violence Against Women Act was reauthorized in February 2013 and contained
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lawmaking and programmatic responses to the domestic violence crisis, and the
change in consciousness that the community has experienced about these
issues. As Henry said, "Ms. Manjoo's visit provided the setting for our
community to talk openly about our desire to ensure that women can live lives
free from violence." 397 The Eastern Band revealed that the tribal response to
domestic violence is a holistic and collective process wherein all women and all
families affected by domestic abuse "must be healed," not only "by the
immediate intervention of law enforcement [and] prosecution," but also by
"education, counseling, and other appropriate services." 9 More broadly, as
Henry says, "legal reform often takes years, even decades."399 Thus, addressing
violence against women involves not only increasing the law enforcement
powers of tribal government, but also of getting together "as tribal relatives" to
"find additional ways to protect women and deal with the monsters amongst
us." 400
In many respects, the Eastern Band's response to violence against women
is a jurisgenerative moment in indigenous rights. While Cherokee women had
long advocated for reform through tribal and national law, their engagement
with the Inter-American Commission and Special Rapporteur has connected the
experience of Cherokee women with all women across the globe who seek
justice under the law and a life free of violence. At the same time, as the
Special Rapporteur's Report becomes an aspect of the international human
rights discourse on violence against women, that movement and conversation
can begin to reflect the particular experiences, histories, and values of
indigenous women. The Special Rapporteur noted the many ways the history
and legacy of colonization contribute to the indigenous domestic violence
problem-and stressed the role of indigenous communities in developing
contemporary solutions, both tribal and national, to domestic violence.40 1 These
are potentially transformative departures from the narrow focus on individuals
and states, 402 and indigenous versus Western solutions, 403 that sometimes
397. Id.
398. CHEROKEE CODE, ch. 50B, § 50B-1 (2010), available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes
/ebcicode/50bviolence.pdf. Scholars have noted that measures to address domestic violence must
address the broader impacts of colonization on indigenous and aboriginal women. See Rashmi Goel,
No Women at the Center: The Use of the CanadianSentencing Circle in Domestic Violence Cases, 15
Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 293, 331 (2000) (arguing that "[i]f sentencing circles are to be effective in
combating domestic violence and meeting the needs of Aboriginal victims," they must be used handin-hand with measures to restore women to their "honored place" in Aboriginal society through
"education about the role and status of women in traditional Aboriginal society, specific measures to
restore the traditional role of Aboriginal women in tribal government, spiritual events and rituals, and
within the family").
399. Henry, supra note 385.
400. Id
401. See Report of Special Rapporteur Manjoo, supranote 357.
402. For a sampling of the vast literature considering, often critically, the role of the state in
responding to domestic violence matters, see, e.g., Deborah Epstein, ProceduralJustice: Tempering
the State's Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1843, 1849-56 & n.45 (2002)
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characterizes the discourse about American Indian women and domestic
violence. This is one example of the jurisgenerative process at work, suggesting
the capacity of indigenous and international human rights norms to influence
one another toward individual and collective well-being.
CONCLUSION

A recent report of the International Law Association Committee suggested
that state and international practices supportive of indigenous rights have
"progressively increase[ed] over the last few decades like a flooding river
under an unstoppable rain."4W In this regard, the indigenous human rights
movement, with its historic antecedents and contemporary advancements, is
unfolding before our eyes. With certain key instruments in place, today the
challenge is to strengthen and implement indigenous rights in nations around
the globe.405
While it is too early to make conclusive judgments about the ultimate
trajectory or effect of the indigenous rights movement, several aspects are
already apparent. This is a story about disparate groups who, having a shared,
common history of devastation by European conquest and domination, have
come together as a global community of indigenous peoples determined to
make human rights make a difference. It is a story of indigenous agency and
indigenous values, resilient over time and ascendant in the twenty-first century.
It is a story of the development and implementation of human rights law that is
occurring, and must occur, formally and informally, through dynamic and
interrelated actions in international, domestic, and tribal venues alike. Bolstered
by postwar exigencies and subsequent global commitments to human rights,
indigenous peoples are finally able to embrace the shared, global vision of
human rights on their own terms.
And, finally, this is a story of peoples who never expected human rights to
be pure or romantic. With their eyes wide open, indigenous peoples are using
(tracing the evolution of response to domestic violence from the private to public realm and describing
some scholars' opposition to the one-size-fits-all quality of law enforcement interventions that fail to
account for context of women's lives); Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the
Construction of Multiple Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL'Y

463, 506 (1996) ("Dependence on initiatives which are strategies for authorizing state involvement in
individual relationships have proved debilitating for communities of color and women."); Jeannie Suk,
Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 5-11 (2006) (arguing that the criminalization of
domestic violence enables state intrusions on the home and intimate relationships, with
disproportionate impacts on minorities, in ways that merit exploration).
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human rights law, infused with indigenous norms and processes, as an
empowering tool in their struggle for decolonization and cultural survival, in
relationship with the land and with others who inhabit it. 406 This is, in our view,
a jurisgenerative moment in indigenous rights-a moment when human rights
have the potential to become more capacious, embracing norms of equality and
self-determination, and multiple means of implementation, to reflect the ways
that individuals and peoples around the globe live, and want to live, today.
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